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"Those who oppose the United States will increasingly rely on unconventional strategies
and tactics to offset U.S. superiority such as biological or chemical weapons."
--Defense Secretary William Cohen.
Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress, 1998.

"A bioterrorist attack is likely to be covert we will know we have been attacked only
when people begin to get sick and seek medical attention. In our judgment, it is far more
likely that we will realize a bioterrorist attack has occurred when doctors and nurses
diagnose the first victims of such an attack."
--The Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies
"Physicians today need to be ready to recognize and respond to unusual symptoms that
might signal a bioterror attack. Primary care doctors might be the first to spot the danger
signs, and their knowledge and rapid action could be crucial for the nation."
--Tommy G. Thompson
Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services. September 2002
Introduction

In 1992, Francis Fukuyama, then Deputy Director of Policy Planning for the State

Department, declared that the fall of the Soviet Empire was the final event marking the
victory of western liberal democracy. The world, he argued, had fully and finally been
delivered to the unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism. The title of his

book on the subject summed up this view: The End of History. At the time, it seemed a

possibility: Our enemies had been defeated and the new world order was at hand. Some
ten years later, or more accurately, until September 10th, 2001 such a perspective seemed

worthy of consideration. The events of September 1 lth, of course, make such a notion
seem woefully naive.

Instead, a new world enemy been ordained, and it is a different type of enemy:
different skin, different culture, different means. This enemy is unfamiliar, elusive,
without institutions or uniforms or clear structure, and it wages its violence in

unconventional ways; among these are thought to be weapons of mass destruction of
which biological agents are but one means. Many governments, including that of the
United States, are taking the threat of such weapons quite seriously, but it is only recently

that the American public felt as concerned" the existence and threat of biological weapons
became etched into the public consciousness beginning with the index case of the post-

September 11 th anthrax attacks in October, 2001 and became injected indelibly into it
with the first administrations of smallpox vaccine that began, as fate would have it, with

four physicians at the University of Connecticut Health Center, Farmington, Connecticut
in January of 2003.2
While countless experts describe countless scenarios of how a bioterrorism attack

might unfold, one aspect remains constant through all: once an outbreak is identified, the
focus is on managing the emergency response. On one level, it is indeed a sensible place
to focus. An outbreak from such an attack could become quite large and cause great

panic. On another level, such a focus is shortsighted and possibly dangerous.

An evaluation of the presenting signs and symptoms of nearly all the viable
biological agents shows that they are highly non-specific, creating a ’flu-like’ illness in
the early stages. As a result, it seems quite likely that after an attack the first cases would
be seen in an outpatient setting, when such patients seek out a primary care. Yet, a survey
of the burgeoning body of bioterrorism literature indicates a failure to address this
likelihood. Medline searches reveal virtually nothing directed at responding to or

managing biological agents in the outpatient setting. This oversight is further reflected in
the emergency response emphasis seen at the federal and state levels, where, with the

exception of the CDC, little is offered in the way of training, preparing, or generally

involving primary care physicians in the management of an outbreak from biological
agents. Such lack of attention has resulted in a troubling outcome: both formal and
informal surveys indicate that outpatient clinicians are terribly unprepared to respond to
infections with or to the issues of biological weapons.

Objectives

A tremendous void exists, then, in regards to educating, training, and helping
those working in the outpatient setting. This paper endeavors to begin to fill the void by

addressing the following areas relating to bioterrorism and primary care:
Providing a historical and geopolitical context of the development and threat of
biological weapons
Addressing patient questions/concerns/education regarding biological agents
Addressing physician questions/concerns/education regarding biological agents
Diagnosing infections from biological agents
Management-prior to, during, and following infection with biological agents.
Keeping contacts, staff and self, safe from secondary infection
Engaging and interacting with the public health infrastructure in the event of an outbreak
The purpose of this paper is to begin to address such voids; thereby, creating a
resource for physicians in the outpatient setting that is comprehensive, practical, and easy
to use. Ultimately, the hope is to formally publish the document in some form and have it

made available to physicians for use in the clinical setting with the goal of better

equipping physicians for the challenges of bioterrorism from a patient, medical, and

public health perspective.

By making primary care physicians better able to identify, manage, and involved
in bioterrorism, any bioweapons emergency will more likely be identified sooner, which,
in turn, would result in an outbreak that is less severe, contained faster, and involve fewer
victims.

Materials and Methods

In making the determination that the resources available to the physicians
in the outpatient setting were inadequate, a number of measures were employed.

An in-depth review of the literature was done on Medline, that included searching
on key words of "bioterrorism" and "biological

agents" with such words as "primary

care," "outpatient" and "preventive. Additionally, Medline was searched for articles
with keywords of simply "bioterrorism" and "biological

agents" as well as for specific

biological agents.
Additional sources used included the website for the Center for Disease Control

and Prevention (CDC) which has extensive information relating to bioterrorism.

Similarly, governmental websites such as those of the US Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Homeland Security, The Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), etc.

Additionally, countless non-governmental websites were searched, such as the Center for
Civilian Biodefense Strategies (CCBD), American College of Physicians, various

hospitals and universities, etc.
Textbooks for both infectious disease and bioterrorism were utilized, as well.

In addition, informal conversations took place with numerous physicians working
in the outpatient setting as means of attaining thoughts and insights about issues relating
to biological agents. Similarly, informal conversations occurred with staff at the

Connecticut State Department of Health as well as with staff members at the CDC in an

effort to gain insight into the perspectives of the public health infrastructure at the state
and federal levels regarding bioterrorism and clinician preparedness.

Classification of the Agents

Though the array of potential sources of biological agents is vast, this paper will
focus on the most likely and the hazardous agents: Category A.
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has assessed agents it

deems as potentially viable weapons (see Table 1). The Agency warns that "The U.S.

public health system and primary healthcare providers must be prepared to address
various biological agents, including pathogens that are rarely seen in the United States"

and has categorized these agents as A, B, and C defined as follows:

Table 1

Category A Diseases High-priority agents. These include organisms that pose a
risk to national security because they:
Are easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person
Result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health impact
Might cause public panic and social disruption
Require special action for public health preparedness

Category B Diseases Second highest priority. These including organisms that:
Are moderately easy to disseminate
Result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates
Require specific enhancements of CDC’s diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease
surveillance.

Category C Diseases Third highest priority agents. These include emerging
pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of their:
-Availability
Ease of production and dissemination
Potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and major health impact

Category A
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)

Plague (Yersinia pestis)
Smallpox (variola major)
Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)
Viral hemorrhagic fevers

--Filoviruses-Ebola, Marburg
--Arenaviruses-Lassa, Machupo

Category B
Brucellosis (Brucella species)
Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
Food safety threats

Salmonella species
Escherichia coli O 157:H7

Shigella
Glanders (Burkholderia mallei)
Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)
Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci)
Q fever (Coxiella bumetii)
Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans) NEW!

Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii)
Encephalitis
Alphaviruses-Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, Eastern Equine Encephalitis, Western
equine encephalitis
Water safety threats
Vibrio
Cholerae
Cryptosporidium parvum

Category C
Nipah Virus
Hantavirus
* Modified from the CDC 3

How did we get here?
The use of biological agents is by no means new to human acts of inhumanity.

There are historical records dating back to 600 BC in both in written and visual (tapestry,

paintings, etc) form that document the use of exploiting biology with the same intent as
of those of the present day, but their modalities were cruder. 4 For example, one of the
earliest documented uses of biological warfare, was around 600 BC when Solon of

Athens used black hellebore root to contaminate the water supply of the city of Cirrha,
which he was attacking. When the Cirrhaeans became crippled by severe diarrhea, they
were easily defeated. 5

Around 400 BC, Scythian archers were noted for immersing their arrowheads in
materials such as animal feces, blood, and the tissue of decomposing carcasses before

knocking their arrows in combat. 200 years later, Hannibal led his Carthaginian army
against the naval attack of King Eumenes of Perganum. Hannibal ordered his soldiers to
fill hundreds of clay pots with snakes and then had the soldiers hurl the pots onto the

decks of the Perganumese boats. Hannibal was the victor. 6

A common practice of biologic warfare used in the middle ages is exemplified by
a Tartar attack on the city of Kaffa in 1346, in which the warriors catapulted the corpses

of plague victims into the walled city successfully causing an epidemic, presumed to be
Yersinia Pestis. 7 In 1763, during the French and Indian War, Lord Jeffrey Amherst, for

whom the Massachusetts town and college are named, ordered blankets known to be
contaminated with smallpox be sent to numerous Native American tribes who were

siding with the French. 6 This type of practice became so common and so effective a
military tactic that during the Revolutionary war, General Washington ordered

variolation of the entire Continental army. Variolation required immunization with live

vaccines taken from lesions of smallpox victims, and this "protection" resulted in 1 in

every 2,000 of the vaccinates developing smallpox. 8
World War I is remembered more for the utilization of chemical weapons than for

biological ones, but there was extensive use of anthrax as a means of economic and
political disruption via targeting of enemy livestock. However, in a sagacious and
prophetic move, an effort was made to put an end to the use of biological and chemical
weapons in 1925: The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous, or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, later referred to as
the Geneva Protocol. This treaty was "the first multilateral agreement extending

prohibition of chemical and biological agents." 9

By World War II, the body of scientific knowledge had grown including our
understanding of microbes and microbiology. Not surprisingly, the efficacy of biological

weapons grew. The military of the Japanese empire blazed the deadly trail beginning in
the 1930s with its effort to conquer China, when it dropped from airplanes on at least 11
different occasions, plague-infected rice and fleas across mainland China. From the

1930s through World the end of World War II, the Japanese maintained Unit 731, an

aggressive biological weapons program of unprecedented proportions that was located in
a usurped territory of Manchuria, China. At its peak, Unit 731 is said to have been staffed

by over 3000 scientists and technicians. 1 During WWII, thousands of prisoners of war
including Chinese, Koreans, Mongolians, Soviets, Americans, British, and Australians,
were brought to Unit 731 as subjects for experimentation with the biological weapons

being developed there including: anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, cholera, dysentery, gas

gangrene, meningococcal infection, and plague. 12 All told, over 1000 prisoners were
killed during these experiments, as documented during the war tribunals of the mid and

late 1940s. 3 The Japanese, though the boldest, were by no means alone in their efforts to

develop bioweapons; nearly every major industrial power was attempting to develop such
weapons to varying degrees and with varying success. In 1943, The British were
frantically developing and testing anthrax bombs off the coast of Scotland for use against
the Nazis. This is claimed to have been done in fear the Nazis were readying similar

attacks, and the British wished to reply in kind. 4

Here in the United States, the biological weapons development began in force
after WWII. The development, done in secret, was led by George W. Merck, of Merck
Pharmaceuticals and The Merck Manual. War crime charges against the Japanese
scientists who had developed and tested the biological agents on POWs were ultimately

dropped in exchange for technical help with development of the US program. The focus
of the research was the weaponizing of those agents that later would come to be classified

by the CDC as Category A agents. As the cold war developed, another major focus was
the development of molds and bacteria that were intended for Soviet wheat crops in an
effort to destroy their agricultural base thereby causing food shortages as well as
economic strife. s Recognizing that the Soviets were developing similar weapons, the US

Army ran experiments to assess American vulnerability to bioweapons attack by
simulating these attacks on major cities such as New York, Saint Louis, and San
Francisco, using "harmless" pathogens. After one such harmless test dispersing Serratia
marcesens in and around San Francisco, 11 people became ill and one died of Serratia
infections. The government claimed it was merely coincidence.

10

The US military also wanted to assess the feasibility of using such weapons

against the Soviets and so ran ’simulated attacks’ in Alaska because it best simulated the
climatic and landscape conditions of the Soviet Union. Similar testing was done in
Okinawa to determine feasibility for use in South East Asia. 6

In the mid-50s, a paradigm shift occurred in bioweaponry in which biological
agents that would cause incapacitation or debilitation were seen as preferable to those
causing death. This shift occurred because of a concern that public opinion would more

likely be supportive of the use of bioweapons if death did not result; that is, if it seemed
more humane. This philosophical shift is historically significant in that it marks the rise

to prominence of viruses as biological since viruses tend to be more likely to produce

debilitation rather than deathprobably an evolutionary adaptation to being a host

dependent entity. 16
The use of viruses provided other benefits from a strategic standpoint, as well.
There was the added "advantage" that using viruses made antibiotic therapy irrelevanta

major obstacle in ensuring a successful attack with bacterial agents. Vaccines for the viral

agents often require weeks or months to provide protection. What’s more, there are a far
greater number of viruses to choose from and indeed, the US government was able to

develop approximately 50 viral agents compared with only 16 bacterial agents. 6 In the
modem era, however, experts cite 43 viral agents, 19 bacterial, and four Rickettsia, and
fourteen toxins in the arsenal of viable biological weapons. 17

Another military belief was that infective agents were less useful because they
were deemed to be too unpredictable and could possibly result in infecting our own

troops: agents that could not be transmitted person-to-person were more manageable and

11
more strategic. The one infective agent that was made the exception to the rule was

smallpox. It was exempted because it was so effective-highly contagious, highly durable,
and easily stored, transported and dispersed. 16

Officially, the US government denied smallpox was part of the biological arsenal

claiming it made an unsuitable weapon. In reality it was intended for ’special actions’ and
in fact, the Central Intelligence Agency maintained its own smallpox stock to be used at
its discretion in its special operations. Ironically, during the 1960s, US government

development of smallpox as a weapon was continued at the same time the government
was participating in efforts to eradicate smallpox from the globe. TM Smallpox’s ’useful’

qualities were being noted by other countries, and groups and as early as the mid 1960s, it
occurred to the US officials that smallpox would be an effective agent in a bioterrorist
attack against the United States. 16

It should pointed out that the breakthroughs in molecular biology and
recombinant DNA technology altered the setting of the biological sciences; molecular

biology was poised for the great leap forward into gene manipulation which would begin
the development of more medicines and greater understanding of the science of life.

However, these technologies could be applied to bioweapons and alter development
dramatically, allowing for the development of "super bugs" that could be structured to be
far more virulent and far less susceptible to vaccines and/or antibiotics. 16 It has been said
that with "the current state of research and technology, it cannot be ruled out that a

potential aggressor has genetically manipulated certain characteristics of pathogens or
toxins prior to their use as biological warfare agents. ’’19 The implications of this from a
medical management standpoint are that such manipulations "could increase the

12

virulence, environmental stability and resistance to prophylactic and therapeutic
measures. ,,19

Setting the Stage

Clearly, the development of the current threat of bioterrorism is rooted in the
economic and political landscape of the cold war. The peak of the development here in

the United States occurred in the 1960s with as many as 3500 people working on research

and development ofbioweapons. 11

In 1969, President Nixon joined Great Britain and the Soviet Union in proposing a
ban on continued bioweapons development as well as destruction of the all stockpiled

weapons. The stated reason was that the viability of such weapons was minimal, but the
major motivation was that the power of these types of weapons could be utilized with

relatively little effort by potential enemies. It had been pointed out to President Nixon
that because of the ease of development and relative low costs associated with

bioweaponry, most countries could readily develop bioweapons. This was in stark
contrast to nuclear weapons that require immense financial and technological resources

that few countries have. Biological weapons have even been referred to as the "poor

mans’ atomic bomb. ’’2 As one presidential advisor stated, the prime military concern
regarding bioweaponry was "to keep other nations from acquiring them. ’’16 This may be
what motivated the president to also mandate that a new lab be designated in which small
research quantities of agents be maintained for developing adequate protective measures,

diagnostic procedures, and therapeutics in preparation of a bioweapons attack. The new
lab was named the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
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(USAMRIID). Henceforth the U.S. biological program would be confined to research on
strictly defined measures of defense, such as immunization. 6
The Department of Defense was ordered to draw up a plan for the disposal of

existing stocks of biological agents and weapons." 21 On his order, the "United States
unilaterally renounced first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and weapons
and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare." 16
The position set forth by the US, Great Britain, and the USSR gave impetus to the
United Nations document" The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction,
otherwise referred to as the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). It
was written with the purpose of stopping the development of biological agents as

weapons and to ensure the destruction of stockpiled weapons internationally. It continues
to be the premiere document steering international law on this subject and has, to date,

been signed by 144 countries including all the permanent members of the UN Security
Council. 21

The BTWC specifies that no nation is to:

"...produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other
biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of
types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or
other peaceful purposes, and weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed
to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict." 21

Not surprisingly, there have been great difficulties in ensuring the BTWC is enforced.

Every signatory nation is bound to submit a list of all bioweapons facilities, to list all
meetings held at the facilities, to provide an exchange of information on biological
warfare agents, as well as any disease outbreaks. However, no provisions were made for

14

oversight or enforcement of these guidelines by the UN Security Council or by neutral
nations.

Much of the problem lies in the unclear distinction between military and

legitimate public and/or corporate development. Such ambiguities are being refined even
now, some thirty years later. Thus, the continued production by countries, among them

Iraq, is one source for the availability and threat of bioweapons. In the case of Iraq, the
threat (or perceived threat, depending on the perspective) is direct. However, another

threat is a result of countries involved in production then selling or trading their

bioweapons to the highest bidder. 6
The first documented occurrence of bioweapons being given to a third party was

during the early 1980s when it is believed that the Soviets gave mycotoxins to the
communist governments of Vietnam and Laos for use against CIA supported-resistance
movements. Mycotoxins, derived from fungi, are known to be mutagenic, teratogenic,

and carcinogenic. 22 These agents are believed to have been dispersed from crop dusters
over villages and cities. International relief workers witnessed the characteristic "Yellow

Rains" and the subsequent elevations in distinctive morbidity and mortality patterns in

the population. These reports prompted US accusations that the Soviets were in violation
of the BTWC. Soil samples positive for the mycotoxin, recovered documems,
confessions by local authorities, and other evidence were dismissed by the Soviets. They
denied having violated the BTWC by giving the agents for use, and pointed out that

mycotoxins are found naturally in these regions 23. The Reagan administration pressed the
issued only to be cautioned that top US govemment scientists were theorizing that the

yellow rain was a result of the feces from indigenous honeybee swarms. 16 Doubt
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remained in the West until Vladimir Passechnik, a top Soviet biologist working in their

bioweapons program, spilled the proverbial beans. 17

It has since been well documented that despite their being a signatory, the Soviet
Union, through the 70s and 80s, did not halt their research. Indeed, it is now known that

they expanded both biological and chemical weapons research after signing the BTWC.
At its zenith, the Soviet program, known as the Biopreparat, had a staff of about 60,000
working at about 50 facilities. By way of comparison, the Soviet program was nearly 20
times the size of the US program at its respective peak. It is understood, in retrospect, that

the signing of the BWTC in 1972 was seen by the Soviet Union as an opportunity to gain
an edge over its Cold War foes. 24

At the time, however, there was no proof of their bioweapons escalation, though
the US and worldwide intelligence communities were deeply suspicious that the Soviets
were actively developing bioweapons. It took an accident to get confirmation. In 1979, a

presumed accidental release of anthrax from a bioweapons research facility occurred in

Sverdlovsk, Russia, (now called Yekaterinburg), killing nearly 70 people of inhalational
anthrax. 25 Despite all evidence pointing to the likelihood of Soviet violation of the

BTCW, the Soviets denied everything and accused the West of anti-Soviet propaganda.
The Soviet government claimed the infections resulted from anthrax-tainted meat. There
was no admission from the Russian Government until 1992. 7 They have since reverted

back to denial as the official position. 25 Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians
have maintained Biopreparat though it is thought to have been scaled down considerably

which, for reasons that will be discussed, is apparently a mixed blessing.

In 1989, the US and United Kingdom teamed up in an effort to force the closure
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of Biopreparat. Inspection teams were periodically sent into Russia from 1989 to 1994. In

1994, President Yeltsin decreed that no further offensive work would be done. 25

Although Biopreparat was maintained after the fall of the Soviet Union, many of the
bioweapons facilities were left in disrepair and many of the researchers who had been
well-rewarded by the ruling Communist Party were suddenly without a job. There were
and continue to be grave concerns that many of these scientists would agree to work for

’rogue’ countries or extremist or paramilitary groups to help in the development of
biological weapons programs and, furthermore, that, in exchange for handsome
payments, stockpiled biological agents, including smallpox, may presently be or may

already have been smuggled out of Russia or other former Soviet states into the hands of
governments or subversive groups. 6 Many feel that this is the greatest threat to keeping
bioterrorism out of hands of those who might use them. The threat seems ever greater as
these Russian laboratories are experiencing ever worsening financial difficulties:
substantial numbers of scientists have departed and security is even more lax. Which
countries and groups have actually hired these scientists is unknown, but it is well known

that Libya, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea have actively been recruiting these

scientists.24
In order to help ensure peaceful use of technology and resources, western funding
has been sent to Russia to provide bioweapons scientists with financial alternatives to

accepting jobs from potential enemy states, is Analyses by numerous nongovernmental
agencies estimated the number of countries suspected to be developing weaponized

biological agents at 14, most of these are in Asia, North Africa, or the Middle East.

17

.

Excluding China, most of these are "developing" nations. Including China, almost none
of these countries are democracies

26

As mentioned, a possible threat is the use of bioweapons by a nation still
producing them. Iraq is one such country in the political as well as media spotlight. At the
time of this writing, the most recent war in Iraq is declared over but it should be noted

that with the end of the war in Iraq in 1991, the UN Security Council resolution SCR 687

created and empowered the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to, among
other things, seize all biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons found in Iraq. Initially,

the suspicion that Iraq produced or even possessed was just that, suspicion.27Though

during the Gulf war, stockpiles of camelpox virus, which is very similar to smallpox
virus, were discovered in Iraq. The Iraqis denied any intention of using Camelpox for

biologic warfare. 2 In terms of bioweapons, UNSCOM reported that for the first four

years after the Gulf War, the Iraqi government denied having any involvement in the
production of bioweapons and denied having acquired any bioweapons. In 1995, they

acknowledged having a bioweapons development program but denied ever having

actually produced any bioweapons. Soon thereafter, the head of Iraq’s military
industrialization program, General Hussein Kamal Hassan, confessed the depth and

breadth of the bioweapons program to western intelligence officials. 27 Iraqi government
documents indicated production of 20,000 liters of botulinum toxin and 8000 liters of
anthrax spore suspension, though the United Nations believes they made closer to ten
times that amount. 2 SCUD missiles with a range of 300 to 600 km and carrying 400-1b

These countries include: Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan,
Russia, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan,
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bombs had been outfitted with botulinum toxin and anthrax warheads, and drone aircrafts

had been equipped with aerosol dispersal systems.

It was admitted by the Iraqi government that their program involved five sites for
the production of human bacterial and viral pathogens as well as plant pathogens. 27 It has
since been documented that in 1988 alone, Iraq imported various strains of bacterial

agents, (from a US company!) and 39 tons of growth medium for virulent agents, such as
anthrax and botulinum. Six tons of this growth medium have yet to be accounted for by

UNSCOM. 16’27 Much of the bomlinum known to be in Iraq is unaccounted for. As will
be discussed later (see section on Botulinum) botulinum is the most toxic poison in
existence and Iraq is thought to have possessed enough to kill everyone on the planet. 29

Of course, much in the way of Iraqi resources for such development comes from
the US government because in mid to late 1980’s, Iraq was considered a US ally and was

provided military aid in Iraq’s war with Iran. The alliance with Iraq stemmed in large part
from US intelligence being concemed that the Soviets would invade the Persian Gulf in
an attempt to seize control of world oil supplies. The US military had planned to respond

to such an event by teaming with Iraqi forces to repel them; hence, the willingness to

supply Iraq with military resources. 16
The seriousness of the potential threat posed by the Iraqi bioweapons program can

be understood from the perspective that US bioterrorism experts indicate that Botulinum

toxin, could theoretically be purified so that 3 kilograms (6.5 lbs), an amount easily

transported in a suitcase, would be enough to kill the world’s population (see Section on
Botulinum toxin below)

.16 It is estimated that, theoretically, only a millionth of a gram

of inhaled anthrax is a lethal dose. 3 Based on this figure, simple calculations reveal that
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only about 6.5 kilograms (14.3 lbs) would be enough to kill everyone on the planet.

However, it is more commonly believed that 100 kg (less than 50 lbs) would kill roughly
3 Million peoplea figure comparable to the detonation of a Hydrogen Bomb. 31

Although the precise quantities of these agents possessed by Iraq is not known,
Madeleine Albright testified to the UN that Iraq possessed, at one time, enough

weaponized anthrax to kill the entire population of the world several times over. 27 As of
this writing, Iraq’s bioweapons capability is presumed by certain Western leaders to be

intact. The suspicion of Iraq’s thriving, vast and oft unaccounted for biological weapons

arsenal has be reaffirmed by a leading Iraqi bioweapons scientist captured in April,

2003.32
In February 1989, the threat was understood and a ban was placed on the sale of
bacterial agents to Iraq as well as to Iran, Libya, and Syria which were also trying to

develop bioweapons.
Notably, the previous Bush Administration began to consider the possibility of
these weapons being given to terrorists and smuggled into the US for use in a
bioterrorism attack. For the first time in the history of the United States, the govemment

began assembling an Emergency-Response team and developing a plan to manage such a
possibility. 6 Signed into effect by President Clinton 1995, Presidential Decision
Directive 39 (PDD-39) was enacted which broadly outlines that in the event of a terrorist

attack, the "crisis management,’ the criminal act itself, will be law enforcement
controlled and headed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department
of Justice (DOJ). It also states that "consequence management," the public health and

safety issues that result, will be under the authority of Federal Emergency Management
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Agency (FEMA). 33 All healthcare and public health involvement, clearly then, will be
under the consequence management side, and thus under FEMA’s jurisdiction. In the
event of an attack with biological weapons, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) will be the primary federal agency for a "coordinated federal response"

and the will oversee the activation of CDC activity. 34 In anticipation of such attacks, the

NIH and CDC are actively researching improved diagnostic and therapeutic modalities as
well as clinical pathways to ensure diagnostic accuracy. There presently being

development of a monitoring system for local ambulatory care encounter records to
monitor for clustering of signs, symptoms and other findings that may indicate the result

of a biological attack. 3s

An important example of an outgrowth of PPD-39 is the establishing by the CDC,
along with state and local agencies, the Health Alert Network (HAN). The HAN is a
nationwide service that disseminates the latest information, provides educational services

and facilitates fast and. effective communication between state and local health agencies,

departments and care providers for better coordination of knowledge, information, and
practices in the event of an emergency of any variety. 36

Another is the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), formerly known as the
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. This was another initiative coordinated by the CDC

to satisfy the vaccination, prophylactic, and medical management needs in the event of a
bioterrorist attack. This includes vaccines, antibiotics, medical supplies, medical

equipment, etc. These resources are maintained at "strategic locations" throughout the
country and are available for immediate delivery. The locales of the sites are known only

by CDC officials. The NPS is structured such that it is perpetually in a state of readiness,
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should a biological or chemical attack occur in the population. The supplies are packaged
so that no specific request need be made; rather, a request for any particular items elicits

a delivery of everything. The term used is the "12-hour Push Package" because the CDC

delivers all packages in less than 12 hours, and it ’pushes’ all possible supplies

(regardless of need). It is also possible for states or municipalities to request particular
items of need. On an additional note, the push package is delivered along with a team of
five or six CDC advisors. 37

How legitimate a threat is bioterrorism?
According to the National Defense University, there have been more than 100
documented cases of biological agents as weapons. Of these, 19 were used by non-

governmental entities for ’biocrimes.’38In the months following September 11 th the world
experienced the relative ease with which a motivated individual or individuals could

spread both infective agents and fear. All told there were 22 cases of anthrax: 11
inhalational, and 11 cutaneous. Five deaths resulted. 31 While the American public found
it hard to conceive of how such things could happen, the Defense Department (DoD) was

all too clear how such a thing could happen after the ’success’ of a scenario it created:

three ’non-experts’ were asked by the DoD to see how quickly and cheaply bioweapons
could be developed: in less than 30 days and with less than a million dollars, the three
were able to develop a thriving arsenal of biological weapons with "enough lethal

microbes to wipe out entire cities." 39

An attack on the scale of a few individuals rather than whole cities is a macabre
bargain. It was recently determined by US Army scientists that the post-September 1 lth
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anthrax attacks used an anthrax powder that was made using "simple methods,

inexpensive equipment and limited expertise." The costs involved in those attacks are

thought to be approximately three thousand dollars.
Clearly then, when bioweaponry can be developed without significant financial or
scientific resources this threat must be taken seriously even from individuals or small

groups.4The scale of infection from the anthrax attacks could have been enormous if the
mode of distribution was via aerosols rather than powdered envelopes. Aerosolized
anthrax would be odorless, colorless and virtually undetectable. 31

The threat of attack, then, stems from four possible sources"
1. The demise of the Soviet Union and with it Biopreparat has left a small army of

bioweapons scientists unemployed. Some may agree or have already begun to work for
nations, groups, or individuals whose intention is to use the biological weapons.
2. Along with the scientists, there are reports that the actual biological agents may

have been stolen from the .abs or are at least unaccounted. They may have fallen into the
hands of those willing and able to use them.

3. Nations who are actively developing biological weapons may choose to use

them or make them available to those who might.
4. Groups, individuals with the resources to make or acquire biological weapons
with the intent to use them in an attack.

Primary Care and Bioterrorism

A survey conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ),
a branch of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), found that 75% of
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primary care doctors did not feel prepared to deal with infections from biological agents;
nor did they feel prepared to identify an illness from a biological agent even in their own

patients. 41
Bioterrorism presents a number of challenges for the primary care physician. The
events of September 11 th and the unsolved anthrax attacks created a certain level of fear
an anxiety. As a community practitioner, community member and leader, the primary
care physician will be looked to as a source for answers regarding the myriad of

questions relating to bioterrorism, and as a comfort for the anxieties and tensions.
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More than that, the primary care physician will be a sentry, watching for the index

case(s) that indicate bioweapons use. In turn, initiating and participating in the public
health response to such an attack will be an important role for the primary care physician.
This will require not only diagnostic vigilance but also an understanding that being a

community physician means needing to be tapped into the public health structure, staying
informed on the latest updates of management, diagnostic techniques, response plans for

the city, state and federal agencies. 43
Should the primary care physician make or even strongly suspect a diagnosis,

many important considerations will arise including medical management of the patient
and possibly of their family or household contacts; notification of public health officials
on all levels; proper means of infection control; issues of vaccination, prophylaxis not

only for the primary care physician but staff as well. The considerations are great and the
choices not always so clear.

As will be discussed later, diagnosis of infection from biological agents is not
always so easy, particularly early in the disease course as the presentation of many of the
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biological agents can be non-specific. What’s more, if the infected person is seen early on
or particularly as the index case, recognition will indeed be difficult. Once an index case

is found, the CDC and other public health officials will begin mobilizing and subsequent

awareness and vigilance will be heightened, thus easing the physician’s burden while also

simplifying the management. "Once an outbreak is identified, then it is relatively easy to
disseminate information on the nature of the infectious disease agent, in terms of its

recognition and control. ’’44 It is precisely because the onset of symptoms presents nonspecifically, and because these symptoms are often ’flu-like’ or somewhat benign, that
there is a high likelihood the index cases will be seen at the office of a primary care

physician. 45
There is a commonly held belief about how a bioweapons attack would play itself
out in the US, and most experts presuppose that the event will occur in the form of a large

scale, catastrophic event, which would immediately illicit activation of an emergency
response system of emergency departments and public health officials. This view is
reflected in the emphasis being placed in terms of response both at the federal and state
level. For example, in the past 6 months, the Connecticut Department of Public Health

has posted five "Public Health Advisories," all related to smallpox vaccination and only
one mentioned primary care physicians. Similarly, the CDC’s website on "Bioterrorism:

Training" has just one link specific to clinicians, and at their webpage "Preparation and
Planning" has no offerings for outpatient clinicians. It’s quite clear then that that primary
care physicians are overlooked both in terms of training needs and as a part of the public

health infrastructure. 46 Such oversight is affirmed by a simple Medline search:
"bioterrorism" and "primary care" elicits 6 titles. In contrast, "bioterrorism" and
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"emergency" elicits approximately 200 titles. In one sense this is appropriate, as the use
of biological agents would indeed require emergency responses of all kinds. However, as
is argued in this paper, though it may become an emergency it will likely begin quietly in

the outpatient setting. By making primary care physicians better equipped to identify,

manage, and involved in bioterrorism, the resulting emergency identified sooner, less
severe, contained faster, and, involve fewer victims.
What’s more, numerous scenarios that have been postulated tend to hinge on a
dramatic event that initiates the attack or by diagnosis in the ED. Some of these scenarios
were developed by the CDC while others were developed by the Center for Civilian

Biodefense Strategies (CCBD) 47 Even with such a scenario, it is still quite likely that
index cases will present in outpatient clinical settings again, in part because of the non-

specific initial symptoms, but also because of the incubation time (depending on the

agent). Another contributing factor in patients seeking out their primary care doctor is the
pre-existing relationship between doctor and patient. A patient, even in the context of an

attack, may feel most comfortable or give first thought to seeing their primary care
physician with whom they have a relationship, particularly if the patient is confused,
sacred or even panicked.

It has been pointed out that even if there is a large-scale attack, the initial case
will present as isolated incidents or with surprisingly low numbers. S. Many feel that

primary care providers will be "sentinels at the gate. ’’44 But even if a dramatic event

occurs, community physicians, were they properly trained utilized, could be an invaluable
means of helping to contain outbreak.
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On the other hand, it is just as likely that future bioweapons attacks would occur
similarly to the way it occurred with the anthrax attacks in the two months following the
events of September 11 th when, over the course of 47 days, 22 cases of anthrax occurred.

Of the 22 cases, five were fatal. With this attack, there were no bombs dropped, no
dramatic pronouncement or Hollywood chaos. Instead, it was simply numerous mailings

of card-sized envelopes with the proper postage. 48 "A bioterrorist attack is likely to be
covert we will know we have been attacked only when people begin to get sick and seek

medical attention’’49 In the index case of the anthrax attack in 2001, the victim, a 63 year-

old man, presented to the emergency department of a Florida medical center on October
2 nd, and was diagnosed with anthrax on October 4 th. Four days prior to admission the

patient was in good health and had left for Florida on a short vacation. On the first day of
his trip he began to feel fatigued, noticed a sore throat, nausea, and a low-grade fever.

Any primary care physician sees countless patients each week complaining of
similar symptoms, especially in October and all though the fall and winter months. The
index anthrax patient could have very easily decided (or been persuaded by his wife) to

have gone to his primary care physician back home or have sought one out while on his

trip in Florida. Would a primary care physician have picked up on the diagnosis or would
he or she instead have reassured him, given him some acetaminophen and sent him on his

way? By October 2ncl, his symptoms were severe and the emergency department was the
right place for him to be.

In either of these two scenarios or in any other scenarios, diagnosing the index
case will be extremely difficult and will only be made in a timely way if primary care

physicians maintain a baseline level of vigilance.
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The following is an attempt to make proper and timely diagnosis more likely by
serving as a resource for primary care physicians. Included is information regarding
means of transmission, basic diagnostic information including: signs and symptoms,

laboratory findings, radiographic findings as well as means of differentiating naturally
occurring forms of infection versus weaponized forms.
Recommendations for appropriate use of prophylaxis and protective measures for

the primary care physician and his or her medical/office staff, as well as the patient’s

close contacts will be discussed, as will what historical information is to be obtained form
the patient. When possible, distinctions are made between the classic or ’natural’ clinical

features of these microbes and the distinctive clinical features resulting from the

weaponized forms of the microbes. In either form, there is, on the whole, a minimum of
available data since most of these agents are no longer naturally occurring with any great

frequency.
Throughout the descriptions of the agents and their diagnoses, is additional
information that may well be needed for answering commonly asked questions about

bioterrorism on the whole and about specific agents, in particular. Included as well are
online resources for patients and clinicians as well as key contact information.

Category A Agents
Anthrax

Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) is a gram-positive, non-motile spore forming
bacterium that infects both humans and animals, particularly livestock. 3Anthrax is found
in a worldwide distribution. The spores, most commonly found in soil, are quite hardy

28

and able to survive for decades under ambient conditions. However, in vitro, spores will
not form unless body fluid is exposed to ambient air. 51

Background
The name ’anthrax" is derived from the Greek word meaning "coal," because of
the black skin lesions it can cause. Anthrax has been present throughout human history
with the first record of it being seen in the Old Testament-Book of Genesis as the 5 th of

the 10 plagues purportedly sent down by the God of the Jewish slaves. The Roman poet

Virgil wrote verse describing the disease in 25 BC. 52
The incidence of anthrax has dropped significantly over the years in

technologically advanced countries, in large part because of vaccination of those at high
riskthose regularly exposed to hides, wools, and other raw livestock products. 52 Prior
to the anthrax attacks in 2001, experience with anthrax was limited. In fact the only

modem experience with the inhalational form was the accidental release of anthrax

spores from the Soviet Bioweapons facility in Sverdlosk, Russia. 3

Epidemiology

In the US, there have been no cases of inhalational anthrax in the past 20 years
and only 18 cases in the past century. There have been only 127 cases of anthrax in any
form in the US during the 20th Century. There are between 20,000 and 100,00 cases of

anthrax worldwide, almost entirely in developing nations; needless to say, information is
limited. 51 Most current public health policies, such as vaccines, as well as medical

management practices are based on limited information and are ever evolving. 24 The
mortality rates for inhalational anthrax are greater than 80% however, this figure was

29
arrived at prior to modem antibiotics and the advent of critical care resources. The post-

September 11 th inhalational anthrax patients had a mortality rate of 40%. 53

Means of transmission.
Infection can occur from either direct contact with active bacteria or indirectly

from contact with spores which then germinate. The spores may be in animal hair, meat,

hides, or other products. The weaponized form of anthrax is constituted in the spore form
and may be maintained as powder, such as with the post-September 11 th attacks, or may
be in an aerosolized form. Anthrax infections can take three forms: Inhalational,

Cutaneous, and Gastrointestinal. 5 For all three, the basic pathophysiology of the bacteria
is the same; however each is different in terms of the local effect and in terms of

morbidity and mortality. Each of the three will be discussed individually.
Pathophysiology
General: B. anthracis derives its virulence from its being encapsulated and as a
result of three secreted proteins: Protective antigen, lethal factor, and edema factor.
Protective antigen facilitates the binding of the bacteria to host cell membranes and

subsequent transport intracellularly of the other two toxins. 51 Edema toxin acts to inhibit
neutrophils as well as causing edema by disrupting water homeostasis. Lethal toxin
causes activation and dysregulation of cytokines such as Interleukin-1 and Tumor
Necrosis Factor. 3
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precautions and has facilities for minimizing aerosols. However, spore handling requires
BSL-3 laboratories. 54
Inhalational Anthrax

Pathophysiology
Since the spores range from one to five microns in size, they easily reach the

alveolar spaces within the lung with inspiration. The spores are quickly engulfed by

macrophages thus destroying most of the spores, however, some manage to survive. The
surviving spores are taken up by the lymphatics and arrive at the mediastinal lymph

nodes at which time the spores undergo germination. It should be noted that germination

may not occur for upwards of six weeks and have taken up to as many as 12 weeks in
some primate studies. 31 Once germination begins, symptoms will appear rapidly.

Symptom onset is a result of bacterial toxin release causing necrosis, edema, and
hemorrhage. It is the toxin level that is associated with mortality. This is significant
because a negative blood culture does not necessarily mean the patient has reached a
point of improvement. Pathologically, no bronchopneumonic processes are noted in
inhalational anthrax. 5
Transmission

Classically, spores located in the soil or in contaminated animal products are
kicked up into ambient air and inhaled directly into the respiratory tract. Because of their

small size, they are able to arrive in alveolar spaces. It is worth mentioning that it had
been thought that the LD0 (The dose adequate to kill 50% of those exposed) was

between 2,500 and 55,000 inhaled spores. While no LD0 has been determined, it’s felt
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that of the deaths that occurred from the post-September 11 th attacks, the LDs0 was

considerably lower. 31
Signs and symptoms

Classically, inhalational anthrax follows a biphasic pattern (early and late) or

may exist as a continuous process. The post-September 11 th anthrax patients presented in
this biphasic pattem. 51

Early (stage I-lasting hours to days): The presenting clinical findings in 10 out of 11 of
the September 11 th victims were myalgia and fever. On the whole, their signs and

symptoms were consistent with the signs and symptoms seen in the zoonotic form. These

signs and symptoms include fever, myalgia, non-productive cough, nausea, vomiting,

diaphoresis, dyspnea, myalgia, chest pain, headache, and tachycardia. Other symptoms
associated include chills, and abdominal pain. 4

Late (Stage II): Respiratory paralysis, diaphoresis, cyanosis, sudden fever, hypotension,
respiratory alkalosis, and terminal acidosis, massive lymphadenopathy, hemorrhagic
meningitis (often with concurrent meningismus), delirium, and obtundation. This stage is
rapidly progressive with shock, hypothermia, and death occurring within 24-36 hours. 31’
51

The transition from stage I to stage II can occur suddenly-as a continuum or even after

a short period of improvement. Classically, Stage II is reached with 2-3 days from onset

of Stage I. 54

Microscopy

Generally, neither sputum culture nor blood culture will be of diagnostic value
with inhalational anthrax primarily because there is little in the way of pneumonic
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processes. Once bacteremia and/or systemic infection occurs, staining and culture may be
of value. 54
Lab findings

Early-none (including no or minimal elevations in WBC)
Late-Hypocalcemia, hyperkalemia, hypoglycemia can be seen. Increases in
hemoconcentration are seen with hematocrits often greater than 50%. 3

Radiographicfindings
Inhalational anthrax is characterized by a series of radiographic and tomographic

changes that can greatly aid in diagnosis. These are summarized in tables 2 and 3,
respectively. The post-September 1 lth anthrax patients were found to have some or all
of the features discussed below:
ure 2 Anthrax-Chest X-ray at presentation

Courtesy of Earls JP Radiology 2002 Feb; 222(2): 305-12

The findings include a widened mediastinum,
right hilar enlargement/mass (arrow), fight pleural effusion,
and right perihilar airspace disease.
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Fi

3 Anthrax Chest

3

Courtesy of Earls JP Radiology 2002 Feb; 222(2): 305-12

Effusions and air-space disease increased dramatically
over the initial several days. Effusions re-accumulated several times
necessitating repeated thoracentesis

Computed Tomography
All CTs taken of the post-September 1 lth anthrax patients showed abnormalities.
There is historical and medical significance to the CT findings. Because of the rarity of
inhalational anthrax in the modem era, and particularly since the advent of CT scans, no
CT-studies had been published prior to the post-September 1 lth anthrax attacks. The

results are corroborative of the classic chest X-ray findings and CT is now considered an

important tool in diagnosing anthrax. 5

35

Fil

ure 4 Anthrax-Chest CT at Presentation

Courtesy of Earls JP Radiology 2002 Feb; 222(2): 305-12

Widespread hyperattenuating adenopathy (key diagnostic feature)
The largest lymph node (arrow) is in the subcarinal region

Fi ure 5 Anthrax-Chest CT

Courtesy of Earls JP Radiology 2002 Feb; 222(2): 305-12

Effusions were considerably larger and filled more than 50% of each thoracic cavity
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Fi ure 6

Windows at

;entation

Courtesy of Earls JP Radiology 2002 Feb; 222(2): 305-12

Note the bilateral moderate-sized pleural effusions,
And bibasilar air-space disease peribronchial thickening (arrows)
Fi ure 7 Chest CT-Lun Windows at

Courtesy of Earls JP Radiology 2002 Feb; 222(2): 305-12

Note the peribronchial thickening (arrows).
Table 2hic findings-Chest X-ray

Chest X-ray- key diagnostic features of Anthrax
Radiographs provide critical diagnostic information many hours or even days before
blood and sputum cultures can be used to confirm the presence of anthrax. However,
please note that radiographic changes may appear late, which indicates a poor prognosis.
Characteristic chest X-ray findings"
Presence of a widened or abnormal mediastinum
Hilar adenopathy
Pleural effusions
Peripheral air-space disease
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Table 3 Key rad!ggraphic findings-CT
Chest CT-key diagnostic features of Anthrax
Initial CT studies in virtually all of the post-September 11 th inhalational anthrax cases
were markedly abnormal and had an unusual combination of findings that are believed to
be useful for diagnosing inhalational anthrax. These cases are the first correlative study of
CT and inhalational anthrax. CT appears to be a promising tool or making diagnosis.
Characteristic chest CT-findings:
Enlarged hyperattenuating mediastinal and hilar lymph nodes
Diffuse edema of mediastinal fat
Peribronchial thickening
Pleural effusionsss

Differential diagnos&-based on symptoms: pneumonia, influenza, viral syndrome, sepsis,
bronchitis, central nervous system (CNS) infection, and gastroenteritis. 56

Differential diagnosis -based on radiographic changes: histoplasmosis, sarcoidosis,
tuberculosis, and lymphoma. 57
Diagnosis:

Early diagnosis requires a very high index of suspicion because of the nonspecific nature of the early symptoms. Inhalational anthrax is particularly hard to

diagnose particularly because it may be hard to distinguish from pneumonia, which is
orders of magnitude more common. Yet, early diagnosis is vital for successful
management. This cluster of symptoms described above--especially fever or sepsis along
with consistent radiographic changes in an otherwise healthy patient requires that anthrax

be considered in the differential. 53

In the event of an epidemic, nasal swabs may be taken from those with possible
exposure and any positive results necessitate prophylactic amibiotic regimen. Please note
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that neither the sensitivity nor the specificity of nasal swabbing has been ascertained. A

negative result does not rule out the possibility of infection. 51

Because the natural course of germination and replication is occurring in the
lungs, distinctive clinical features are seen: Pleural effusions, lymphadenitis, hemorrhagic

mediastinitis.31, 51

Table 4 Key diagnostic features of Inhalational Anthrax

Making the diagnosis oflnhalational Anthrax
oPattem identification: 1. Multiple, concurrent cases of an afebrile illness that progresses
rapidly to death.
2. Afebrile illness seen in high-risk groups (see Table 19)
following a following an identified attack
Presentation: afebrile, pneumonia-like presentation
Chest X-ray: Widened mediastinum, infiltrates, pleural effusion.
Findings:
CT: Enlarged, hyperattenuating hilar and mediastinal nodes, mediastinal
edema, peribronchial thickening, and pleural effusions.

Modified from
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Prophylaxis
Inhalational

Recent studies on animal models have shown that the anthrax vaccine offers
protective value against the inhalational form of anthrax, while humans studies have

shown protection against the cutaneous form. The vaccine is an acellular filtrate of an
attenuated form of the bacteria and given in a series of six doses at 0, 2, and 4 weeks,
then 6, 12 and 18 months, followed by yearly boosters. It’s been shown that protection is
attained after even two doses. 56 Studies indicate it is relatively safe with about one

percent of people developing some kind of minor reaction; a headache being the most
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common no long-term sequalae has been reported. When given with proper antibiotic

therapy, there is protection against development of the disease even after exposure.

Current stockpiles of the vaccine are limited and no increases in production are expected.

At present, vaccination is given only to those in the military. While the post-September
1 lth anthrax patients were not given the vaccine however, a number of people deemed to
at risk for possible exposure were given the vaccine along with antibiotic therapy (see

Appendix C for full list and for dosing schedules). 31
Prognosis

Because of so few cases of anthrax- particularly inhalational- no clear factors can
be associated with morbidity and mortality. All that seems clear at this time is that early

recognition with initiation of combination therapy (see section on management below)

appears to be key for survival. Among the post-September 11 anthrax patients, those
who presented with fulminant anthrax before antibiotic therapy was initiated died (see
section on treatment below). 31

Cutaneous Anthrax

By far, the most common naturally occurring form (over 95% of all cases), the
cutaneous anthrax is usually results from direct contact with infected livestock or
livestock product. 51’31 This form could be seen in a biological attack particularly in a

powered form as was used after September 11 th.(1 1 of the 22 cases were cutaneous). 31
Left untreated the mortality rate is approximately 20%. With appropriate antibiotic
coverage, mortality is less than 1%. 53
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Transmission
Infection results simply from bacterial contact with skin particularly if any

abrasions or openings are present. Exposed skin surfaces are, of course, the most
common sites. Incubation period appears to be short: usually less than two weeks after

exposure (versus inhalational).

8

Recognition of the cutaneous form may be crucial

because it may the first and best evidence that an attack with anthrax has occurred. 58,31

On an historical note, it is believed that one of the September 1 lth hijackers was seen by a
Florida physician for what was initially diagnosed as a skin infection but was later

(during the September 11 th attack investigations) diagnosed as cutaneous anthrax. 32 A

proper diagnosis initially might have altered historyfurther highlighting the importance
of properly training outpatient clinicians.

Pathophysiology
The same three virulence factors that act in the lung in inhalational anthrax act

cutaneously at the site of contact. 58
Signs and Symptoms:

Early- Classically, there is a painless, pruritic, papular primary lesion that forms
with one week of exposure to the endospore. The papule has commonly been mistaken

for an insect bite, initially. 8 Within 2 days of papule eruption, 2-3 mm vesicles form
around the papule containing serous or serosanguinous fluid (comaminated with
numerous bacilli and the occasional WBC). These vesicles may grow and often satellite
vesicles appears. The site may become highly edematous, but non-pitting, secondary to

the release of edema toxin by the bacteria. The lesion ruptures, enlarges, and becomes
necrotic forming an ulcer covered by the black eschar for which the disease is named. See
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Pathology

Any vesicular fluid should be sampled and gram stained, or if the patient is on
antibiotic therapy already, a punch biopsy should be taken of the lesion.

Differential diagnosis
Tularemia, plague, scrub typhus, anticoagulam necrosis, Rickettsial spotted

fevers, rat bite fever, and ecthyma gangrenosum, vasculitides, arachnoid bites, leprosy,

Lymphogranuloma venereum, chancroid. 59
Diagnosis

As with the inhalational form, early diagnosis is very difficult and requires a high
index of suspicion. However, the black escahric lesion is strongly suggestive particularly

in an edematous setting. 53
Table 5 Key diagnostic features of cutaneous anthrax

Making the diagnosis of Cutaneous Anthrax
Pattern identification: 1. Multiple, concurrent cases of a maculopapular lesion that
forms an eschar; regional adenopathy. Prodromal symptoms may
be seen
2. Illness with maculopapular lesion that becomes escahric seen
in high-risk groups (see Table 19) following an identified attack
Presentation: initial painless, pmritic papular lesion that drains, enlarges, ulcerates and
forms an eschar that falls off in 1-2 weeks, Low-grade fever and
malaise may be seen.
Escharic
skin
lesion.
Findings:

Treatment
It should be noted that antibiotic therapy does not alter the natural history of he
skin lesion but does reduce the likelihood of systemic disease occurring. Untreated,

mortality from cutaneous anthrax is around 20% (see Appendix C for full antibiotic
regimen). 31
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Gastrointestinal anthrax
Transmission

Transmission is not clearly understood but is believed to result from either

ingestion of the vegetative form of anthrax from the consumption of undercooked,
infected meat or by spore deposition in proximal portion of the gastrointestinal (GI) tract.

If infected via spores, it is likely that inhalational anthrax infection may also be present.

No cases of GI anthrax were diagnosed among those infected in the post-September 11 th
anthrax patients. 31

Signs and symptoms

Onset of symptoms classically begins within 2-5 days of ingestion. If the upper GI
tract is affected, oral or esophageal ulcers form with regional lymphadenopathy, edema,

and sepsis. In the lower GI tract, intestinal lesions form usually in the terminal ileum or
cecum resulting in nausea, vomiting, malaise, bloody diarrhea, acute abdomen, or sepsis.

Hemorrhagic mesenteric lymphadenitis can be seen as a later development as can ascites.
Systemic disease may develop and yields the same array of signs and symptoms as found
in the systemic forms of inhalational and cutaneous infections. 6
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Table 6 Key diagnostic features of gastrointestinal anthrax

Making the diagnosis of Gastrointestinal Anthrax
oPattem identification: 1. Multiple, concurrent cases of:
a- vomiting, bloody diarrhea, acute abdomen
b. orophaymgeal ulcers with adenopathy
2. GI symptoms seen in high-risk groups (see Table 19)
following an identified attack
Presentation: early-vomiting, bloody diarrhea, acute abdomen, later-sepsis;
possible orophaymgeal ulcers with adenopathy
UGI series: Widened mediastinum, infiltrates, pleural effusion.
Findings:
CT: mesenteric lvmohadenitis, ileocecal ulcers

General Considerations on Anthrax

Though occurring far more commonly in inhalational anthrax, progression to
systemic disease will occur in any of the forms if left unrecognized, and therefore
untreated. Based on the management of the post-September 1 l th anthrax patients, blood
cultures can become sterile after one dose of antibiotics, making it even more critical than
usual that blood cultures be drawn prior to antibiotic administration. 54
Diagnostic Considerations

If anthrax is suspected or even on the differential, the laboratory should be
notified as a protocol set forth by the CDC needs to be followed to ensure proper

diagnosis. 31 The context of patient illness is of critical importance. As evidenced by the

post-September 11 th anthrax patients, certain groups are at higher risk: Postal workers,
mail room workers, media personnel, politicians and their associates, microbiology lab

personnel, those who have had recent contact or proximity to politicians, federal, state or

local, government employees, as well as visitors to monuments or government buildings,
visitors to prominent media institutions, etc. That is to say, the importance of taking a

thorough and relevant history cannot be emphasized enough including the often-
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neglected travel, occupational, and social histories. Obviously, clustering of cases with
similar signs, symptoms and other findings, particularly if traceable to a single foci such
as a building is highly suggestive of a biological attack. 54

In any unexplained death in which anthrax is a possible cause, it is imperative that
an autopsy be done. A finding of hemorrhagic necrotizing mediastinitis or hemorrhagic

necrotizing lymphadenitis is considered pathognomonic for inhalational anthrax.
Hemorrhagic meningitis is highly suggestive of a systemic anthrax infection. 3

Treatment
Precisely because of the limited experience with anthrax, and because there exist
no clinical studies, treatment guidelines are far from definitive. What is generally agreed

upon is that because of the rapidity with which symptoms set in and progress, particularly
with inhalational anthrax, early administration of antibiotic therapy is vital. Thus, any

person who is at high risk for possible exposure to anthrax must be put on antibiotics
covering anthrax. 31

Presently, Ciprofloxacin is FDA-approved for treatment of inhalational anthrax.
Ciprofloxacin, doxycycline and penicillin G Procain are approved for use in post-

exposure prophylaxis of inhalational anthrax. Doxycycline and penicillin G Procain are

approved for use in cutaneous and gastrointestinal anthrax. 61

FDA approval notwithstanding, the CDC and The Working Group on Civilian
Biodefense (WGCB) b recommendations are that for inhalational anthrax a multidrug

regimen of ciprofloxacin or doxycycline plus another antibiotic that is likely to have
b

The WGCB is an expert panel including 23 representatives from academic, government, and private institutions with
expertise in public health, emergency management, and clinical medicine convened by the Center for Civilian
Biodefense Studies at the Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health to develop consensus-based
recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals for certain biological agents that
may be used civilian populations. The term ’recommendations’ as used in this paper, refers to Working Group
recommendations.
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sensitivity such as rifampin, vancomycin, clindamycin, and aminoglycosides (see
Appendix C for full list and for dosing schedules).

53

After susceptibility testing, the regimen should be altered appropriately to include
not only the most efficacious but also the least toxic antibiotics available.

Recommendations, at present, are that treatment continue for 60 days because of the risk
of recurrent disease from delayed spore germination, however once the patient is

clinically well enough, parenteral administration can be changed to oral administration

(see Appendix C for dosing schedules). Thoracocentesis may be indicated depending on
the clinical scenario. 31

Cutaneous anthrax

Although, penicillin has traditionally been used to treat cutaneous anthrax, current
recommendations are for either ciprofloxacin or doxycycline for 60 days. Occupational
sources of cutaneous anthrax need only be treated for 7-10 days; however if inhalation of

spores is possible, then the 60-day antibiotic regimen is needed. In the case of a possible
bioterrorist anthrax attack, cases of cutaneous anthrax must be presumed to have
concurrent inhalational exposure. 61 It should be noted that antibiotic therapy will not

prevent formation of the cutaneous lesions, but will prevent systemic infection. No

topical therapy is indicated. 31
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Gastrointestinal anthrax

Current recommendations are to follow the same drug guidelines as those for
inhalational anthrax.

Post-Exposure Prophylaxis
Current recommendations are that any asymptomatic people with likely exposure
to anthrax should be treated prophylactically with oral administration of ciprofloxacin or

doxycycline for 60 days to ensure preventing infection from delayed germination of

spores. 61,31
Further Treatment Considerations
While samples taken from patients from the post-September 11 th anthrax attacks

showed susceptibility to each of the three FDA approved treatments, weaponized strains
of anthrax are known to have been developed which possess resistance to each of these. 3
There is no clinical basis for recommending the use of multiple versus single drug

regimens, but it is felt to be a reasonable therapeutic approach by the WGCB.
If meningeal involvement is known suspected, ciprofloxacin is preferred over

doxycycline because of its improved CNS penetration, with additional coverage of
penicillin, rifampin, or chloramphenicol.

Adjunctive therapies such as steroids, Anthrax IgG antisera, tumor necrosis factor

(TNF) inhibitors, anthrax vaccine, etc., may have a role in improving the anthrax
patient’ s condition however there are no clinical studies to support there use in this
context.
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Infection Control
Zoonotic forms of anthrax cannot be spread from person-to-person, nor does it

appear that in the post-September 11 th anthrax patients did any patients become infected
from person-to-person transmission. Standard barrier isolation is recommended for the

in-patient setting, however, neither air filtration systems nor masks are indicated. 31
There is no indication for administering anthrax vaccine or prophylactic antibiotic

therapy to any contacts of the patient including family, friends, medical providers, etc.
Only those who are likely to have had similar exposure as the patient are candidates for
prophylaxis. 53
The laboratory to be used must be notified so that appropriate handling measures
can be in place. Local,

State, and Federal public health officials must be notified (See

discussion on Notification further on). 54

Standard antimicrobial cleansers such as hypochlorite may be used for cleaning

up any bodily fluids that may be infected. 6

Botulinum toxin

Botulinum toxin includes seven different proteins (identified A- through G) that

are secreted by four distinct but closely related types of Clostridia bacteria. C. botulinum
is a spore-forming, obligate anaerobe found most commonly in soil. 62

Background
Botulinum is the most potent toxin in existence. Theoretically, one gram, properly

dispersed would kill over a million people. It is colorless, odorless, and said to be
without taste. 29 An outbreak of botulinum is considered a medical emergency and will
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entail the use of antitoxin as well as the likely utilization of life support systems.
Botulinum toxin as a weapon of bioterrorism posses some distinctive features from the

other Category A agents. To begin with, it is the product of a microbe and not the
microbe itself that is virulent. 62 Strangely enough, botulinum is the only biological toxin

approved for therapeutic uses in the treatment of such conditions as tetanus,
blepharospasm, strabismus, etc. 13. It is also approved for use cosmetically in the
treatment of wrinkles. Although unapproved by the FDA for these, it has been used for

treating migraines, chronic back pain, achalaisa, and other conditions.

Historically, many of the deaths associated with botulism were a result of
exposure from improperly prepared and canned foods. 63

As a weapon, botulinum is far more potent (per equivalent weight) than any
synthesized chemical toxins, and is considered the most toxic substance (ounce for

ounce) known to humanity. Acts of terrorism involving botulinum have already
occurred, with three separate attacks all in Japan including one at a US military base.
Fortunately, none of the attempts were successful. Of note, the botulinum used in these
attacks was made from clostridium cultures that were grown from local soil samples. All
four of the designated members of the "Axis of Evil" are believed to presently possess or

have begun production of botulinum. 29

Through automated processes, large quantities of botulinum can be produced and
introduced in an attack in aerosol form or through contamination of the food or water

supplies (though no waterborne illnesses have ever been reported with botulinum).
Inhalation results in a similar presentation to foodbome infection, but the slower

absorption rare though the intestinal mucosa results in a slower onset of symptoms. 29
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There are three naturally occurring forms of botulism: foodbome, wound, and
intestinal. An additional form, resulting from the weaponization of botulism is:

inhalational.63
Epidemiology
Natural outbreaks are rare. Based on pattems from natural occurrences, there are
less than 200 cases (including all forms) each year in the US with equal distribution
between men and women and ages. Foodborne botulism results in roughly nine cases per

year and outbreaks average 2.5 cases. The largest foodbome outbreak was in 1977 at a
restaurant in Michigan with 59 cases. 29 Of the seven forms ofbotulinum toxin, A, B,

and E are most commonly seen in humans. F is rare; C and D are more common in nonhumans and G does not appear pathogenic. 62

Means of transmission
All three naturally occurring forms result from Clostridium synthesis of
botulinum either in vivo or prior to entering the bloodstream. Botulinum enters the body
via absorption through the mucosal linings of the gastrointestinal tract or the respiratory

tract or from a contaminated wound. Botulinum cannot enter the body through intact
skin. A bioterrorist attack with botulinum would likely be from an aerosolized form

although it is possible that it could occur through contamination of food or water. Some
protection is offered by simply covering one’s mouth with thick or folded cloths such as a
handkerchief (see Patient Questions section below). Fortunately, sunlight denatures the
toxin rendering it harmless within 1-3 hours of exposure and the chlorine content of most
63
municipal water supplies inactivates approximately 85% of botulinum toxin. Foodbome

outbreaks, natural or deliberate, require foods that are uncooked or are poorly cooked.
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Natural infections tend to occur from contaminated vegetables- and particularly those that

have a relatively high pH, such as beans, corn, carrots and peppers.29The mortality rate in

the modem era is less than 5%. 62
Neither botulism nor botulinum is infectious; they cannot be passed from person-

to-person. 29

However, a theoretical risk exists for transmission. It is now known that the
Soviets had been experimenting with splicing the Clostridium gene that codes for

botulinum toxin into an infectious bacterial agent. Accomplishing this would effectively
create an infectious form of botulinum. Whether the Soviets (or others) were successful

in their efforts is not known. 25

Pathogenesis.

Once inside the bloodstream, the toxin will bind at neuromuscular junctions in the
periphery. The biological effects ofbotulinum toxin are a result of polypeptide chains: A
and B. The B subunit binds irreversibly to the pre-synaptic motor neuron. The toxin is

endocytosed into the terminal end of the axon. Once inside, subunit A functions to cleave
the SNARE proteins-the proteins involved in the release of acetylcholine (Ach) into the

synaptic cleft. Consequently, no Ach reaches the post-synaptic neuron and, therefore, the
neuron cannot be activated. Motor paralysis results. Botulinum toxin cannot cross the

blood-brain barrier. 63

Signs and symptoms

All forms of botulism present with the same general signs and symptoms.
Foodbome botulism may begin with nausea, vomiting, cramping, or diarrhea but this is
believed to be unrelated to botulinum toxin and rather a result of other Clostridial
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metabolites. Such a distinction is noteworthy because even if a bioterrorist attack
involved contaminated food or water, only the neurological effects will be seen as it will

purified toxin and no Clostridium will be present. So, regardless of the mode of attack,
the presentation will be same. 29

Onset of symptoms is seen between 12-36 hours after exposure depending on the
extent and amount of exposure. In animal studies, low doses have been shown to take up
to a few days prior to onset of symptoms, and in higher doses, symptoms are seen in well

under 12 hours. It is important to note that there can be extreme variation in the scope and

timing of symptoms. However, all cases from mild to severe will include cranial nerve

(CN) paralysis since the toxin always affects bulbar musculature (see table 7 for clinical

features). 29
Early- CN Palsies, especially those affecting the eyes and the oral pharynx, are
noted (See figure 10a, b). Patients seek medical care for one or more of the following

complaints: difficulty seeing, speaking and swallowing. Next affected are the skeletal
muscles which become weak and show a diminished deep tendon reflex (DTR) and

undergo flaccid paralysis--occurring in a symmetrical, descending and progressive
pattern (with accompanying loss of deep tendon reflex). 29

Late: Collapse of the oropharyngeal airway can occur when those muscles
become weak. Two other late features are loss of the gag reflex, and pupil dilatation

(possibly fixed). Skeletal muscles may be paralyzed with accompanying loss of DTR. A
grave danger is the weakening of the diaphragm and accessory muscles; this can lead to

cyanosis and/or CO2 narcosis secondary to CO2 retention. Overt respiratory failure can
occur within 24 hours of symptom onset. 63
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Labs
Routine laboratory studies and CSF show no abnormalities. 29

Microscopy
Since most laboratories do not have the appropriate tests for diagnosing botulism,

the primary care physician should be prepared to send out samples including: serum (>30

mL), stool, gastric aspirate, and if possible: vomitus and suspect food. Ideally, collection
should be done prior to antitoxin administration. However, if the patient is symptomatic,
do not delay antitoxin treatment for the sake of sample collection (see section on

Treatment, below). A current patient medication list should be sent with the samples. 29’ 63
Radiographicfindings

No distinctive radiological findings are associated with botulinum exposure.

Differential Diagnosis
The following illnesses may present with similar findings: Guillain-Barre,

myasthenia gravis, or tick paralysis enteroviral myelitis (which would have CSF
consistent with viral infection and usually an antecedent fever), Inflammatory myopathies

(noted by elevated creatinine kinase), viral encephalitis, atropine poisoning (which
demonstrates mental status changes), chemical nerve agents (marked by copious

respiratory secretions and miotic pupils), staphylococcal emerotoxin B (SEB) (see table

8). Please note that only the bioweapons included in the differemial diagnosisnerve
agents and SEB-- would be likely be seen in clusters. 29’ 63,64
Botulism can be distinguished from other causes of flaccid paralysis because in

botulism, CN involvement is more prominent than weakness and flaccidity of the

periphery; this is particularly true in the early stages. 29
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Table 8 Differentiating botulinum, Chemical nerve agents, and SEB
SEB
Features
Chemical Nerve
Botulinum Toxin

Agents
Time of onset

Nervous system
Cardiovascular

12-24 hours
Descending flaccid
paralysis
No effect
Early-normal
Late-paralysis

Minutes

Convulsions,

1-6 hours
Myalgia, headaches

fasiculations

Bradycardia
Dyspnea,

Mild elevation

Gastrointestinal

Ileus

Painful diarrhea

Cough-non
productive,
Chest pain
Nausea, vomiting,

Ocular

Mydriasis

Miosis

diarrhea
Conjunctival

Salivary

Ptosis
Decreased
2-3 days

Copious

Slight increase

Minutes

None

Improvement

Rare
Improves GI
symptoms

Respiratory

Death

Response to
Atropine

Airway constriction

injection

Adapted from 63

Diagnosis

Presently, few laboratories have the capacity to test for botulinum toxins and

therefore, there will likely be some delay in getting a definitive diagnosis. Supportive of
the diagnosis would be an afebrile patient with no sensory impairment and no mental
status changes who has flaccid paralysis with prominent cranial nerve involvemem. The
classic diagnostic features are summarized in table 9.

Table 9 Key diagnostic features of cutaneous anthrax
1. Clear sensorium-botulinum does not cross the blood brain barrier
2. Afebrile
3. Paralysis-symmetric, descending, flaccid. Cranial involvement is
always present most commonly with one or more of the
4Ds of CN palsies:

Diplopia
Dysarthria
Dysphonia

Dysphagia
Adapted from 29

The 1,2,3,4 of botulinum diagnosis
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As always, distinguishing natural occurrences from a bioterrorist attack will be
difficult but any case requires making such a distinction, when possible. Detecting an

outbreak would require a thorough history, in addition to the bioterror history (see table

19), botulinum necessitates that dietary behaviors and history be sorted out. Inquiring
about foods recently eaten to consider likely sources, others who may have similar if any

(which is significant), is important. Beyond that, it would be clustering of signs,
symptoms and other findings that would be the strongest indicator of an attack. If no
common dietary source can be detected, it might suggest an inhalational attack (See table

10). Also suggestive, is the identification of a toxin that is not one of the commonly
occurring ones in foodbome cases: commonly toxins are A, B, and E (which comes from
fresh or salt water fish). C, D, G are thought likely to be used in an aerosol attack. 29
Table 10. Features Suggesting a Deliberate Release of Botulinum Toxin
An outbreak of a large number of cases of acute flaccid paralysis with prominent cranial
nerve involvement
Outbreak with an atypical botulinum toxin type (i.e., type C, D, F, or G, or type E toxin
not acquired from an aquatic food)
Outbreak with a common geographic factor but without a common dietary exposure
Multiple concurrent outbreaks with no common source

As with all potential cases of biological agents a careful travel/activity and occupational
history must be taken and when botulinum is being assessed, as thorough dietary history,
should be taken. Establish clustering by asking patients if they know of other persons
with similar symptoms, or by noting similar signs, symptoms and findings in others.
Adapted from 29
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Table 11 Key diagnostic features of Botulism

Making the diagnosis of Botulism
oPattem identification: Multiple, concurrent cases of a symmetrical,
descending progressive motor paralysis
Presentation: Symmetrical, descending and progressive flaccid paralysis with
cranial nerve palsies
Findings: History, clinical presentation, and epidemiology determine diagnosis

Treatment
Treatment is a two-fold approach: antitoxin and supportive measures.
Botulinum antitoxin, available from the CDC, should be administered as early as

possible because the neutralizing effect acts on circulating botulinum in patients whose

symptoms are still progressing. It does not reverse symptoms that are already present. 63
Antitoxin administration should not delayed for the sake of sample collection. Once the

symptoms have reached a plateau there is no more botulinum in the bloodstream and,

hence, the antitoxin offers no therapeutic value. In foodbome botulinum, in which the
toxin is thought to be absorbed slowly and steadily by the intestinal mucosa, the antitoxin

is thought to be most efficacious. Antitoxins’ usefulness in the event of an aerosolized

bioterrorist attack is uncertain, because antitoxin has never been tried on humans in cases

of inhalational botulinum. However, animal studies suggest that if given before onset of

symptoms, antitoxin is highly effective; if given after onset of symptoms, respiratory
failure still results (See Appendix C for dosing schedule). 63 With the recommended dose,

the amount of neutralizing antibody provided far exceeds the toxin levels found in
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naturally occurring botulism patients, so further administrations are not needed. A
bioterrorist attack with botulinum may result in dramatically higher serum toxin levels; it

may be warranted to check antitoxin neutralization by retesting serum for toxin after
treatment. 29

Should antitoxin be unavailable or delivery delayed, and foodbome botulism is

suspected, standard detoxification measures such as activated charcoal may be
administered, however no data exists to indicate the efficacy.

12

Please note: trivalent antitoxin is available against toxin forms A, B and E. and

therefore identifying the toxin type is important. Although A, B, and E are the most
common naturally occurring forms, a different form maybe used in biological attack.

USAMRIID has developed a non-specific antitoxin that is available under Investigational

New Drug (IND) status for use on all seven botulinum toxin forms. 63
For the most part, supportive measures can include the use of enteral or parenteral
63
feedings, admission to the intensive care unit, and mechanical ventilation. Any patient

in whom botulism is suspected or who is diagnosed but is having progressing symptoms

should be carefully monitored for progression to respiratory failure as well as for the loss
of the gag reflex, swallowing integrity, inspiratory strength and vital capacity.

Classically, 20 % of foodbome botulism patients require mechanical ventilation. A major
concern is that an attack with botulinum toxin causing a large outbreak would saturate

available support measures (ICU beds, ventilators, available staff, etc).

29

Please note, in the presence of a concomitant secondary infection, the use of

aminoglycosides and clindamycin are contraindicated because of their tendency to
exacerbate neuromuscular blockade. 29
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Vaccine

Currently there is vaccine available from the CDC under IND status. It is a

pentavalent toxoid, given in a series of four shots, that offers pre-exposure prophylaxis
against types A, B, C, D, and E. Use is only suggested for those individuals and
populations at high risk to inhalational botulinum. The use of a heptavalent toxoid
vaccine for post-exposure prophylaxis has shown positive results in animal studies; no

human studies have been done nor are any planned. 63

No pre-exposure prophylaxis is available to the public and at this time no plans
exist for such a plan. 63

Infection Control
Botulinum is readily destroyed. A temperature of 85C or higher for more than
62
five minutes decontaminates food or beverages.

Any clothes or skin that come in contact with botulinum toxin can simply be
washed in soap and water. Objects or surfaces may be cleaned in 0.1% hypochlorite
solution. Natural degradation occurs within 2 days.

29

Primary care physicians and their staff need only standard precautions when

dealing with botulinum exposure. Isolation is not required.

29

Notification
Diagnosis of botulism is considered a medical emergency (regardless of the

source) and public health notification must begin at the local and state levels. If
bioterrorism is suspected then federal notification both of public health and law

enforcement must be initiated (see discussion on notification below).
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Plague (Yersinia pestis)
Yersinia pestis is non-motile, non-spore forming, gram-negative rod. Infection

with Yersinia tends to take one of three forms: bubonic, primary septicemic and

pneumonic with bubonic, historically, being by far the most common form. Classically,
the disease is transmitted from infected rodents to humans by fleas residing on the rats.

As a biological weapon, pneumonic plague is expected to be the predominant forlYl. 65
Background
The first documented epidemic of Yersinia is known to have occurred in 561 AD.

It began in Egypt and spread along trade routes killing upwards of 60% of the
populations of Europe, North Africa, Southern and Central Asia. The second great
Yersinia outbreak occurred in 1346 and killed roughly one third of the population of

Europeroughly 25 million people. Historians believe that it’s nickname, ’black death’
was coined during this time--likely because of the gangrene commonly resulting in the

acral areas. 66

In both pandemics, it is thought that the bacteria spread locally from infected rats

(and their fleas) and from people (and their fleas). The disease spread more distally from
ships carrying all three--people, rats, fleastraveling to distant sites. The third pandemic
occurred in 1855 beginning in China but eventually spreading worldwide. 1 There
continue to be intermittent outbreaks throughout the globe. Present day outbreaks remain

isolated and better controlled primarily because of higher standards of living, improved
sanitation and hygiene, and the availability of antibiotics.
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Though modem day outbreaks are of limited scope, the use of plague as weapon
could change that. As discussed earlier, the Japanese military demonstrated in WWII that
11
it had the capacity to initiate outbreaks in various sites in China. It is well known that

most of the world’s existing biological weapons programs include work on developing

Yersinia as an agent in aerosolized forms-thus eliminating the need for rats and fleas.

67

It was estimated in 1970 by the World Health Organization (WHO) that 50kg

(110 lbs) of Yersinia sprayed over a city would infect 150,000 people killing roughly
40,000.
Weaponized Yersinia versus Zoonotic Yersinia

As always, distinguishing a case of naturally occurring disease from a bioterrorist
attack is not easy. Large numbers of cases would, of course, be suggestive of an outbreak,
and the clinical form (see below) itself might suggest that the zoonotic form or a
deliberate attack might be more likely. Important criteria to consider include cases in
areas with no zoonotic source, infection in patients with no discemable risk factors (such
as exposures), and infection in the in absence of recent documentation of rodent deaths.

1

The signs and symptoms of weaponized plague may demonstrate a wide range of

presentation. Please note the distinctions discussed below. The primary care physician
must be cogniscent of both zoonotic and weaponized forms and even with a reasonable

suspicion of zoonotic transmission a positive diagnosis must raise the specter of
bioterrorism as possible source.
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Epidemiology

In the past 50 years there have been roughly 1700 cases of plague in the US. Over
1400 (14% mortality) were bubonic, more than 220 (22% mortality) were septicemic,
with the remainder being pneumonic forms (57% mortality).

66

Means of transm&sion
Naturally occurring Plague transmits to humans from bites of infected fleas that
typically derived their infection through having bitten infected rodents. Generally, such
transmission results in the bubonic form of the plague. A small percentage, however,
will develop a septicemic form referred to as primary septicemic plague. It is important to

note that in neither of these two forms can humans transit to other humans. However,

those infected with pneumonic form of the plague can spread the disease through
aerosolized droplets. 66

Because the most likely means of transmission used in a biological attack would
be the use of aerosols, there would be a far higher percentage of the pneumonic form than
is seen naturally.

However, the extent of the outbreak from an attack would be influenced

by a number of variable including climatic conditions, as well as the amount and types of
Yersinia strain used. It is even possible that an attack could come in the form of a

deliberate infection of a natural animal vector such as infecting a rodent with Yersinia
within a major city. 67

Pathogenes&

In zoonotic transmission, bites from fleas carrying the plague introduce upwards
of a thousand organisms into the dermis. Once present in the cutaneous tissues, Yersinia
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Patients may also experience ulcerations at the site of the fleabite. Septicemia is a

possible progression of the bubonic form (see below for discussion of septicemia) and is
referred to as secondary septicemia. Secondary septicemia occurs in approximately 25%
of the bubonic patients although roughly 80% are found to be bacteremic. Untreated,
1’
bubonic plague has a mortality of approximately 60%, and under 5% if treated.

65,66

Primary Septicemia

There are some who are bitten by fleas carrying Yersinia but in whom no bubo
formation occurs. Instead, the patient presents with septicemia; such a scenario is

classified as primary septicemia. 68

The septic picture seen in both primary and secondary is similar to that caused by

any gram-negative infection. These signs and symptoms include high fever, rigors,
68
malaise, hypotension, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, and too commonly, DIC. The

distinctive features seen with plague septicemia include thrombosis formations in the

acral vessels, resulting in necrosis and gangrene of those regions. Black necrotic

appendages and more proximal purpuric lesions caused by endotoxemia are often present.
Organisms can spread to the central nervous system, leading to meningitis characterized

by meningismus and fever. 66
Pneumonic Plague

The pneumonic form can occur as a result of progression of either the septicemic
or bubonic form. When pneumonic plague develops as a progression from bubonic or

septicemia it is referred to as secondary pneumonic plague. It results when hematogenous

spread of Yersinia occurs and bacilli end up in the lung. Symptoms include those of
1
severe bronchopneumonia, chest pain, dyspnea, cough, and hemoptysis.

65

Primary pneumonic plague occurs when the bacilli are inhaled directly into the
respiratory system and similar signs and symptoms to those of secondary pneumonic

plague result. It is believed that a bioterrorist attack involving plague would likely present
as a primary pneumonic infection or possibly typhoidal. Like the other forms, the

incubation period runs between one and six days. Fever occurs first with dyspnea and

cough that may be productive of water or blood, and possibly purulent sputum.
Pharyngitis may also be seen in these patients accompanied by cervical adenopathy.
There are additional reports that primary pneumonic plague patients suffer from

gastrointestinal distress including nausea, vomiting, pain, and diarrhea. 1’

68

Historically, pneumonic plague epidemics have been infrequent, but when they
did occur in the pre-antibiotic era, the mortality rates were 100%, and, in the antibiotic

era, if treatment is delayed more than 18 hours after onset of symptoms survival is

thought to be highly unlikely.
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Distinguishing primary plague from secondary can be difficult but the absence of
buboes is highly suggestive of primary. Unfortunately, the most definitive way to

distinguish is via pathological examination. Untreated, death from primary pneumonic

plague is within 4-6 days after onset of symptoms. Death is usually secondary to
respiratory failure, circulatory collapse, multi-organ failure, or DIC.

l

It is important to keep in mind that pneumonic plague, as with all these forms,
may progress to a septic picture and the resultant complications of (DIC), purpura, or
small vessel necrosis (leading to gangrene in the periphery), azotemia, and multi-organ

failure, as discussed above (see Section on septicemia above).
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Chest X-ray of pneumonic plague. Note the presence of left lower and middle lobe
infiltrates

Differential diagnosis
Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome, Cat scratch disease, cellulites, necrotizing
fasciitis, pneumonia, tick-bom diseases, gas gangrene. 66
Diagnosis

Whether zoonotic or an act of terrorism, plague infection is never an isolated
event. Whether the patient is seen in the office without any other cases having been

reported, or if the physician sees a disproportionate number of such cases, the physician
must recognize the diagnosis as the start of the epidemic, and notification of local, state,

and federal agencies must be initiated immediately (see discussion below on
notifcation. 67
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Early diagnosis is essential and, as always, requires a high index of suspicion
regardless of the source. Reports of sudden increases in pneumonia cases complicated by
sepsis signals the likelihood of a bioterrorism attack. 1 Patients who are otherwise

healthy, without risk factors for pneumonia, presenting with acute onset dyspnea, fever,
and hemoptysis is highly suggestive; even more so if more than one case presents. If this
scenario is seen but there’s no hemoptysis, consider anthrax. 66

There are no widely available diagnostic tests for Yersinia. Gram-staining is
useful in that it will at least identify the gram-negativity. A Wright, Giemsa, or Wayson
stain will reveal the safety pin appearance. Most zoonotic strains ofplague produce an

F 1-antigen in vivo, which can be detected in blood samples via immunoassay. A four-fold
rise in antibody titer in patient serum is retrospectively diagnostic. 67

Table 12 Key diagnostic features of Plague

Making the diagnosis ofPlague
Pattern identification: 1. Multiple, concurrent cases of fever, cough, chest pain,
dyspnea; results in high morbidity and mortality.
2. Multiple, concurrent cases of gastrointestinal
symptoms: diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain;
results in high morbidity and mortality
Symptoms: Variable according to form of infection: cutaneous-cervical or
inguinal bubo, gangrenous acral areas (late); respiratorytachypnea, dyspnea, cyanosis, consolidations on chest exam;
systemic-sepsis, shock, multi-organ system failure.
-Variable according to form of infection:
Findings:
-Chest X-Ray-consolidations, infiltrates,
-Microscopy-bipolar or "safety pin" appearance of gram-negative
bacilli.
Adapted from Inglesby
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Treatment

No clinical trials have been done on therapeutic efficacy for plague infection so
current recommendations are presumptive. However, current recommendations include

initiating antibiotic therapy as soon as possible, selecting from among: streptomycin,
gentamicin, ciprofloxacin, or doxycycline with a 10 to 14 day course. Symptoms improve
within 3-4 days but the extended regimen prevents relapse. Chloramphenicol is the drug

of choice for plague meningitis. Standard supportive therapies should be initiated, as is

clinically warranted. 1’ 67
Buboes will resolve with antibiotic therapy and generally require little in the way
of specific management. Incision and drainage may increase risk of transmission, but

may be performed with aspiration for symptomatic relief. 66

For persons with known exposure but who are asymptomatic, doxycycline should
be given orally for one week or for the duration of exposure plus one week. Tetracycline
or ciprofloxacin may be substituted (see Appendix C for dosing schedules).
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Vaccine

At the present time, no vaccine exists that affects pneumonic plague, however
active research and development is currently underway.

Infection Control
There is little data concerning person-to-person transmission so recommendations
are of uncertain appropriateness. At this time, Standard Precautions are recommended. It

is suspected that transmission can occur via droplet nuclei and thus wearing surgical

masks is adequate protection along with strict patient isolation until the patient has been
on antibiotics for at least 48 hours or until cultures come back. 67

71
There is no available data to suggest that decontamination is needed, as
Yersinia is highly fragile lasting only a short time outside of a host. What’s more, with

Yersinia, no spore form exists so ambient conditions do not permit prolonged survival. 1

Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)

Francisella tularensis, the causative agent of Tularemia, is a small, non-motile,
facultative aerobic, intracellular gram-negative coccobacilli. Francisella tularensis has

three different species of which F. tularensis biovar tularensis is the most virulent form
and it is the one most commonly seen in the US. The organism is considered to be one of
the most infectious bacterial pathogens known. It is also quite hardy, able to persist for

several weeks in water, soil, vegetation, or animal carcasses. 7 Natural reservoirs include,

mice, rats, and squirrels that attain the infection through direct contact and by insect
vectors such as ticks and mosquitoes. 72

Background
Tularemia was firs identified in 1911 by a scientist investing a suspected outbreak

of bubonic plague in Tularane County, California. The disease has numerous modes of
transmission and numerous forms of presentation. 7OWaterborne epidemics were seen in

Europe and the Soviet Union in and around WWII. It has been suggested that the Soviet
outbreak, which occurred at the Russian front during WW II, was a result of a deliberate
biological attack by the Russians. As discussed earlier, tularemia has been a foremost
agent in the development of biological weapons since the 1930s. In 1969, the WHO
estimated that 10 kg (20 lbs) of aerosolized F. tularensis could infect 50,000 people and

kill approximately 4,000. However, these numbers may be sorely outdated, particularly

72
since it is thought by some experts that during the 1980 and 90s, the Soviets were able to

develop strains ofF. tularensis that are resistant to antibiotics and vaccines. 71
Epidemiology

F. tularensis is found worldwide, though global incidence is not known. In the

US, tularemia has been seen in all states except Hawaii but it is seen predominantly in the
rural areas of southem, southwestem, and midwestem states. Since the 1990s, there have

been less than 200 cases reported per year in the US. 70’ 71 Cases are seen within a bimodal
distribution: summer/fall, the larger of the modes, is thought to be secondary to tick

transmission, and fall/winter is thought to coincide with hunting and trapping seasons.

Most cases are secondary to direct contact of some kind although there are infrequent
cases of infection from inhalation. 72

No significant differences in infection patterns are seen by age or by gender, v
Overall mortality rates prior to the advent of antibiotics ran between 5 and 15%,

and for pneumonic forms between 30 and 60%. In the antibiotic era, overall mortality
runs at less than 2%. 71

Means of transmission
In the United States, most human disease is acquired through tick-bome
transmission. 7 Since infection can occur through bacterial contact with skin, mucosal

linings, gastrointestinal epithelium, and the respiratory tract, humans can become infected

by being bitten by infected ticks, by handling contaminated animals or animal products,

by ingesting contaminated food or water, or by inhalation of aerosolized bacteria, n
There is no person-to-person transmission with F. tularensis. TM
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Weaponized F. tularensis could be dispersed in a variety of ways, with the

greatest public health threat being from the aerosolized form. Aerosol dispersion in a

densely populated area would likely result in widespread reports of fevers and nonspecific symptoms within five days of dispersion. A large percentage of these people
would develop pleuritis and/or pneumonitis. The abrupt onset of these symptoms in such

large numbers and in otherwise healthy subpopulations should alert physicians and public
health officials to the likelihood of an attack. 72

Pathogenesis
The virulence factors utilized by F. tularensis are not well known. Once
inoculation occurs, regardless of the site, an intense focal inflammatory response occurs.

PMNs and other leukocytes soon track in and a suppurative necrosis results with
granulomas eventually forming. Pathology of the site shows a non-caseating, centrally
necrotic region enclosed by epitheliod cells and multinucleated giant cells as well as
fibroblasts in an array consistent with granulomatous pathology. F. tularensis is able to
survive oxidative attacks by polymorphonuclear (PMN) cells, and the bacteria is taken up

by macrophages and brought to regional lymph nodes at which time the bacteria
multiplies and then spreads to organs such as the kidneys spleen, liver, lymph nodes, and

lungs. Bacteremia can be detected early in the infection. 71

In primate studies of inhalational tularemia, peribronchial inflammation as well as
in alveolar septal inflammation was observed within 72 hours of infection; later,

pneumonia developed with consolidation, granulomas, and ultimately chronic interstitial
fibrosis. 72
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Despite initiation of antibiotic therapy, the lymph nodes may become

progressively more fluctuant and even rupture. Pneumonia develops in 10-15% of
patients (see below for discussion of pneumonic tularemia). 70-73
2. Glandular- (10% of cases) This form (considered by some to be a subset of

ulceroglandular) presents with one or more enlarged regional lymph nodes but
without any cutaneous lesions or ulcerations (see figure 16). 71,72
3. Typhoidal, (10%) generally occurring after an inhalational exposure (though it
can occur from skin or mucosal contact), patients present with fever and chills but

without any clear focus of infection. Patients may develop rhabdomyolysis and

subsequent renal failure, sepsis and DIC (even with apparently negative blood

cultures). Pneumonia may develop, as well, and can be quite severe. Pneumonia
can occur in all the forms but is most commonly seen as part of typhoidal

tularemia (see below for discussion of pneumonic tularemia).

71,73

The typhoidal form is distinctive in that, unlike the other forms, no

lymphadenopathy is present.
In the event of a deliberate attack using aerosolized F. tularensis, typhoidal
tularemia would likely be a dominant form. Untreated, typhoidal tularemia has a

mortality of roughly 35%.
4.

Pneumonic

71,73

occurring rarely in nature, the primary form results from inhalation

of F. tularensis. It is seen mostly in laboratory workers while the secondary form,
from hematogenous spread of an existing infection, is more common, otherwise.
Pneumonic tularemia has a high mortality rate regardless of the source.

Symptoms include at least one of the following: pharyngitis, bronchiolitis,
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6. Oculoglandular- (less than 1% of cases). This form results from ocular contact
with F. tularensis. Unilateral, painful, purulent or ulcerating conjunctivitis are the

presenting symptoms. Other findings include preauricular lymph node

enlargement and often with periorbital edema. 72’ 73
Regardless of the form, infection may spread hematogenously, leading to secondary
pleuropneumonia, septicemia, and possibly, meningitis. Tularemia sepsis is of particular
concern and often fatal. The tularemia septic picture includes fever, diarrhea, vomiting,

and abdominal pain. With progression, mental status changes are noted and coma may
occur. Shock and systemic inflammatory response syndrome can occur with DIC, ARDS,

and multi system organ failure. 71
Labs

Findings are generally non-specific. WBCs can be normal or up to 22, 000 cells
per milliliter. Other blood work is generally normal, especially early on. Up to 50% of
patients may have mildly elevated transaminases, alkaline phosphatase, and lactate

dehydrogenase. There may be evidence of creatinine kinase elevation as a result of
rhabdomyolysis. 20,21
Microscopy
Microscopy reveals a small bacteria, 0.2 x 0.2-0.7 microns (far smaller than

anthrax) that is pleomorphic, with faim staining. Unlike Yersinia, it has no bipolar
staining features. It is a fastidious organism with relatively slow growth, and most strains
require special nutritionally supplemented media for growth. 7

At present there is no readily available rapid diagnostic laboratory test for F.
tularensis. Routine microbiological screens would likely fail to pick up an otherwise
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unlooked for case. If a case is suspected, the lab should be notified so special screens as
well as precautions can be prepared. Samples should include respiratory secretions and

blood (see Appendix D).

Diagnosis is made fluorescem antibody labeling performed only at designated
public health labs, which can have results back within several hours.
Definitive diagnosis is made with cultures grown from pharyngeal, sputum, or
even gastric aspirate samples; it is unusual for the bacteria to from blood samples. 7173

Radiographic findings
The first finding likely to be seen on chest X-Ray in the pneumonic form is
bronchial infiltrates which later are seen as bronchopneumonic infiltrate involving at least
one lobe. Pleural effusions may also be seen with hilar adenopathy (see figure

17). 71

The typhoidal form would likely reveal mediastinal lymphadenopathy or

pneumonia. 21.
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Fi ure 17 Tularemia: chest

Courtesy of Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

Note left lower lobe infiltrate,
enlarged left hilum, and tenting of left hemi diaphragm
Regardless of the form, 50% will have signs of pneumonia, and about 15% will have

pleural effusions on chest X-ray (See figure 17). The pneumonic form may have other
findings such as" Interstitial patterns, cavitary lesions, bronchopleural fistulae, and

calcifications.73
Differential Diagnosis
The broad and non-specific nature of the symptoms results in a large differential.
The likelihood of tularemia can be assessed with a thorough exposure and travel history.
Pneumonic- plague, anthrax (both of which would progress faster and have higher

fatalities than tularemia), Q-fever.

Typhoidal- salmonella, rickettsia, malaria and other "typhoidal" illnesses.
Glandular-mycobacterial infection, cat-scratch disease (Bartonella infection),

lymphogranuloma venereum, streptococcal or staphylococcal lymphadenitis, malignancy
or lymphoma, fungal infection, and plague. 7’ 72
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Diagnosis

In recent decades, tularemia has become so rare that it has warranted almost no
diagnostic suspicion, however, the political climate is such that it must be given more of
a priority. As with several of the other forms of tularemia, the accurate diagnosis is

reached if an appropriate exposure history is elicited. 7 As with all the category A agents,

clustering and monitoring of signs, symptoms and other findings, and epidemiology will
be the most powerful tool for noting an outbreak. Even in index case, a clinician may

pick up the diagnosis if he or she notes the atypical pneumonia with Chest X-ray showing
pleuritis and hilar lymphadenopathy as distinctive findings particularly if seen in more
than one patient, and if the history supports the exposure likelihood. 73

Table 13 Key diagnostic features of Tularemia
Making the diagnosis of Tularemia
opattem identification: Multiple, concurrent cases of sever respiratory, febrile illness
Presentation: early-febrile illness, otherwise, variable according to form of infection:
pharyngitis, pneumonitis: cutaneous-ulcerations; lymphadenitis; latesepsis, SIRS, inguinal bubo, gangrenous acral areas
late; respiratory-tachypnea, dyspnea, cyanosis, consolidations on chest
exam; systemic-sepsis, shock, multi-organ system failure.
Variable according to form of infection:

-Findings:

Chest X-Ray-bronchopneumonic findings in at least one lobe, pleural
effusion. Less common: diffuse granulomatous lesions, discrete
infiltrates, enlarged hilar lymphnodes.
Microscopy-small, gram-negative coccobacilli in respiratory secretions.
Adapted from Dennis
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Treatment
Outside the context of an epidemic, so that the primary care physician is

managing just an individual patient, the recommended treatment is parenteral
streptomycin or, alternatively, gentamicin (see Appendix C-Tularemia for dosing

schedule). Tetracycline and chloramphenicol are also used but studies indicate higher
rates of treatment failure and of relapse, probably because of their bacteriostatic
mechanism. Fluoroquinolones appear to show good efficacy, with ciprofloxacin performs

well in vitro, however its use in tularemia is not FDA approved. Macrolides and beta

lactams show little effect against F. tularensis and should be avoided, v
Parenteral administration can be switched to oral when clinical improvement is
seen. In large-scale outbreaks, oral administration is the role. Doxycycline and

ciprofloxacin are the preferred antibiotics (see Appendix C-Tularemia for dosing

schedule). 71
As was mentioned, there is a possibility that an attack may involve a modified
strain ofF. tularensis that is resistant to antibiotic therapy. Clearly, susceptibility testing
will be done should an outbreak occur. 73

Vaccination

Pre-exposure prophylaxis-There is a vaccine that had been available to those
working with and around F. tularensis and was available under IND protocol; at present,

however, the FDA is assessing it. Small retrospective studies of these workers (workers
at USAMRIID) showed that the vaccine offered significant protection against
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inhalational tularemia, and though there was little change in ulceroglandular rates disease
course was less severe. Current recommendations are that the general public not be

vaccinated. 73

Post-exposure prophylaxisbecause the vaccine takes two weeks to offer
protection, no recommendations exist for use of the vaccine after exposure. Studies have
shown that antibiotic therapy started within 24 hours of exposure and continued for full
course

(see Appendix C-tularemia dosing schedule) offered full protection against

inhalational tularemia. If more than 24 hours has passed since exposure, fever monitoring

should be done and any inexplicable fever or prodromal symptoms within the next two
weeks should be treated. 71

Close contacts of infected patients need not be treated, as person-to-person
transmission is not known to occur. 73

Infection Control
Because no person-to-person transmission is known to occur, patient isolation
need not be used, although standard precautions should be the practice.

As mentioned, F. mlarensis is quite hardy. The extem of the hardiness, especially
in a deliberate aerosol attack is unclear, but secondary dispersal is not a concern.
Contaminated surfaces and objects, applying 10% chlorine bleach (one part

household chlorine for nine parts water) for 10 minutes is needed for proper
decontamination. A 70% alcohol solution can then be used to for additional disinfection

and for bleach removal.
Individuals with direct contact with contaminated fluid or objects should wash the

appropriate body parts and/or clothes in soap and water. 773
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Viral Agents

Viruses represent a very different type of biological weapon. In some ways they
are much more dangerous. Significantly smaller than bacteria, viruses function by

making their way inside of cells where they subsequently exploit cellular apparatuses and
resources to replicate. Studying viruses is more complicated, more time consuming, and

quite expensive, a6 Antiviral medicines tend to be much less effective against viral
infections as compared to antibiotic used for bacterial infections. There are two major

types of viruses among the Category A agents: smallpox, and viral hemorrhagic fevers.

Smallpox (variola major)

Smallpox is a result of infection with the Variola vires, of the genus Orthopox,
and contains double-stranded DNA virus. TM

Background

In what is arguably one of the finest public health achievement of the twentieth
century, a virus that had killed more people than any other pathogen in the history of
mankind, was confined to two specially selected labs. In 1980, smallpox was declared
eradicated thanks to global vaccinations programs. 28 At that time, it was declared that
nations need not continue vaccination programs. FF. However, it was not quite accurate
to claim the vires was eradicated since, at the time of the pronouncement, the WHO

approved two sites to maintain smallpox: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
in Atlanta and the Institute for Viral Preparations in Moscow. The Soviets, apparently,
did more than simple storage. 6 They took the opportunity to undertake a large-scale
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program to develop enormous quantities and, it is thought, resistant strains, of the vires to
be fitted to intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombs. 24 When the WHO called for
both sites to destroy the stored vires in 1999, neither the US nor the Russians complied.
The call was again ignored in June of 2002. 75 Russia continues to maintain smallpox
research and active development of strains with greater resistance to standard vaccines. TM
There are four considerations that make an outbreak more likely to spread quickly
now than one would have 3 5 years ago. In the current population, there is essentially no

immunity to smallpox because the disease is simply not occurring and vaccinations are
no longer present. Secondly, because of provider unfamiliarity with smallpox, there will

likely be a delay in smallpox recognition by care providers-thus a delay in implementing
isolation, vaccinations, and more time for the disease to be transmitted. The population is
more mobile than it was before both nationally and intemationally. Finally, the world, the

cities, the living conditions are universally more crowded. 77
There are two recognized forms of smallpox: variola major and minor. Variola

Major is a more virulent strain with mortality rates roughly 30% or higher in a vaccine
naive population. Variola major has historically been more prevalent. Variola minor is

considered rather mild with mortality less than one percem. Historically, smallpox, like

its close relative chickenpox, followed seasonal pattems of outbreaks, peaking in the late
winter and early spring. Such a pattem is likely secondary to the sensitivity of the aerosol

droplets to higher temperatures and humidity. TM It is not known what sensitivities (or lack

thereof) weaponized forms might have.
As a weapon, variola major is extremely dangerous. It spreads from person-toperson and vaccinations have been discontinued since 1972. Means of introducing a
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smallpox infection for use in an attack are varied. The vires may be converted into an
aerosolized form and released, it may be introduced via the use of fomites brought to high
traffic areas such as cities or airports, or in the form of infected terrorist volunteers tiding

the subways and buses of major cities. 8

Pathogenesis
When the vires lands in the host’s oropharynx the vires makes it’s way inside the

mucosal lining. From there, it is taken up by macrophages and transported to regional

lymph glands where the virus subsequently multiplies. Cytotoxic T cells and B cells are
then activated. Antibodies begin to form within the first week of infection. 79 On or about

day four, the host becomes viremic while remaining asymptomatic. The vires continues
to multiply at reticuloendothelial sites such as the spleen, bone marrow and lymph nodes.

By day eight, a second viremic episode occurs, only this time the patient develops a viral
syndrome with fever and malaise. As the immune response occurs, the virus is taken up
by white blood cells and as it is transported through the small vessels of the dermis and
pharyngeal mucosa, it is able to infect the surrounding tissue by approximately day 14.
The classic pitted scarring that is left when the scabs form is secondary to destruction of

the sebaceous glands which then shrink and are replaced first with granulation tissues and
then soon thereafter with scar tissue.78’ 80
The lesions in the oropharynx quickly ulcerate because the tissue there, unlike the

dermis, lacks a stratum comeum. As a result of the oropharyngeal lesions ulcerating, the
saliva contains an enormous amount of vires.
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Other than the skin lesions and a hyperplastic response of reticulum cells, no other

organ systems are affected. 78

Means of transmission
Patients are most infective from the onset of the rash until the first scab forms

when infectivity drops precipitously. Once an individual is infected, the virus is spread

secondarily via aerosolized oropharyngeal droplets. The saliva may be positive for vires
even up to six days prior to lesion formation, however the patient is not infective until

lesion formation occurs at which time the viral content of the saliva climbs even higher.

Additionally, infection can also occur through contact with contaminated objects-clothes,
78
bedding, surfaces, etc. The urine is also known to contain live vires.

Infectivity among those in contact with the primary case is estimated to be
between 40 and 80%. 8

It is thought that if 50 people were initially infected from an attack, the number of

people infected secondarily would be 2500 to 5000, increasing 50 to 100 fold with each
successive generation. Such numbers are due in large part to the relatively long
incubation period until the lesions appear at which time infectivity is high. However, the

lesions will not likely be properly diagnosed for several days during which time the vires
is being transmitted. Once the lesions look like the classic form, infectivity level has

diminished (see Signs and Symptoms below).
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Signs and symptoms

Symptoms generally begin at the end of the incubation period that generally runs
between one and two weeks. At the end of this period, the patient experiences high fever
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Encephalitis sometimes occurs, but secondary infections are uncommon.

78-80

Death from smallpox infection usually occurs around the second week of
infection and is typically a result of toxemia from deposition of immune-complex
formations and hypotension. 8

There are two variations in presentation of variola major that can occur but

comprises less that 10% of all cases and can be difficult to identify. There is a
hemorrhagic form for which gestation appears to be a risk factor. The prodromal

symptoms are similar, but the skin begins to become a dull, dark erythema, with petechial
lesions and frank bleeding into the skin and mucosa soon thereafter. Death occurs in

virtually 100% of cases by day six. 79
The "fiat" type, the second variation of variola major, has the same prodromal

symptoms, but the vesicles never form into papules. Instead, there is confluence of the
vesicles that feels soft and is flattened. Hemorrhages may be seen. The lesions leave no
scar after they eventually peel away, presuming the patient survives.
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Variola minor presents with similar symptoms but of less intensitythe

prodromal symptoms are less debilitating and the rash merely scattered. A similar
presentation is seen in persons previously vaccinated. 79

Microscopy
Collection of viral specimens is extremely important but must be done by
someone properly vaccinated (even as recently as the same day) who is wearing

protective attire: mask, gloves, and gown. To make an adequate collection pustule and/or
vesicular fluids are required. This may necessitate manually opening a lesion with a
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sterile instrument and then transferring the fluid directly or by soaking it up into sterile
material and transported in water tight, vacuum-sealed container. Few available labs will

have the BSL-4 status needed to analyze the specimen. Establishing a positive result for
an orthovims requires an electron microscope. Definitive determination can be made

through viral culturing followed by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) techniques.

However, the diagnosis of smallpox will most quickly and effectively be made using
context of clinical findings and history. Of course, once an outbreak is identified samples

need no longer be collected. 78-80

Radiographic Findings
There are no key radiographic findings associated with smallpox diagnosis

Differential diagnosis
Varicella, disseminated herpes zoster, impetigo, erythema multiform, scabies,

hand foot, and mouth disease. Hemorrhagic smallpox- acute leukemia,

meningococcemia. 81

Diagnosis

Any diffuse vesicular or papular lesions must elicit a differential that includes
smallpox. A careful and thorough history must be taken to assess the risk of possible
exposure. It must be understood by the primary care physician that the first cases in
attack will take up to 2 weeks before the signature skin lesions appear and that the

prodromal symptoms are quite non-specific, underscoring once again the critical
importance of taking a thorough and pointed history. 8

To complicate matters, even if the skin lesions are visible, they are easily
mistaken for Chickenpox. Distinguishing smallpox from chickenpox is extremely
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Table 14. Differences between varicella and variola

Feature
Prodrome
Confluent lesions
Palmar, plantar involvement
Umbilicated lesion
Distribution
Initial Distribution

Stages of lesions

Chickenpox

Smlpox

Centripetal

Centrifugal

(trunk)

(hands, face)

Various

Same

high probability of being present
$= low probability of being present

thorough history. The key distinguishing historical feature being the presence of a viral
prodrome preceding the lesion eruption is consistent with smallpox. 7s’ 79
Diagnosis of either the malignant form or hemorrhagic forms is extremely
difficult.

Table 15 Key diagnostic of diagnosing smallpox

Making the diagnosis of Smallpox
Pattern identification: Multiple, concurrent cases of a maculopapular rash
Presentation: Maculopapular rash especially of the mouth, face and arms and legs
that is preceded by a prodrome with high fever
Clinical presentation and epidemiology determine diagnosis. Must
Findings:
differentiate findings from chickenpox (see table 14)
Adapted from Henderson
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Treatment
At present there is no chemotherapeutic agent available to treat smallpox. Medical
management is strictly supportive. TM There is some evidence that Cidofavir, an
antiretroviral medicine has been found in animal studies to have activity against orthopox
viruses though no clinical evidence exists showing its effect on smallpox infection.

Further investigations are underway. In the event of an outbreak, Cidofavir would be
made available through either the CD or NIH. 82

Infection Control
If a diagnosis is made or even suspected isolation is necessary for that individual
until the lesions scabs dry and fall off. 8 Household members, all healthcare providers

and medical staff must be vaccinated, as should any one who has been in direct contact.

Contact risk is increased by face-to-face contact or cohabitation after the onset offever.

Secondary contacts need not be isolated since even if infected they are not considered to
be a transmission risk until skin eruptions occur. However, secondary contacts should
have their temperature taken each day and any fever greater than 101 F during a

subsequent 17 day period would warrant inpatient isolation. 8 Ideally, home isolation
should be arranged for the patient particularly in light of the fact that admission to

inpatient isolation would put hospital staff at risk and that only supportive measures exist
for management. TM
Isolation will generally be done with the patient’s cooperation. However, if

necessary, quarantine can be enforced by designated public health officials if the public
health is deemed to be at risk. 78

93

CDC guidelines indicate that known and suspected cases as well as febrile known
contacts be admitted to designated hospitals for isolation; while asymptomatic contacts
can be isolated at home. 83 The Working Group recommends inpatient isolation only for

known cases and that febrile contacts be isolated at home until diagnosis is certain. The

differing view is based on the fact that infectivity is primarily an issue only after the
lesions appear, and secondly, that in the context of a widespread outbreak, the CDC

guidelines are impractical. 78

Prophylaxis

In recent years, there has been the planning and initiation of a smallpox vaccine
program. At the time of this writing, however, it has been put on hold. The smallpox
vaccination plan has been a source of enormous debate, a topic beyond the scope of this

paper, however there are some points that useful to discuss here.
The smallpox vaccine itself is a live attenuated vaccinia virus, a member of the
same family as variola. It is administered intradermally usually in the upper arm with a

bifurcated needle. 2-3 insertions in the deltoid area are made for primary vaccinees and

15 for secondary vaccines all in rapid succession within an area no greater than 5mm in

diameter. Within 4 days a pruritic, erythematous bump will appear at the site that over the

following three weeks, blisters, is purulent, then a scab forms which eventually falls away

(See figure 21). 84 The vaccine site and resultant scab should be kept covered, with any
direct contact by others or self should be avoided. Thorough cleaning is indicated if
contact is made. Old dressings should be discarded with care by placing them in well-

sealed plastic bags. 81
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While the smallpox vaccine will offer 95% protection against a typical strain of

variola major, there are some risks involved. Common side effects include low-grade

fever lasting as much as two weeks, regional adenopathy. Less common side effects
include generalized vaccinia (240 out of a million primary vaccinations), eczema (91 in

25,000), post-vaccine encephalitis (10 in a million). Risk of death from vaccine is
estimated at 1 in one million. This data is all derived from epidemiologic studies done on
vaccinees during the 1960s. 8 Treatment of adverse side effects is managed with vaccinia

immunoglobulin (VIG) injection or given along with vaccination in patients at risk.

Some evidence suggests that VIG may be of use in post-exposure prophylaxis as well. 8
Another issue of concern is transmission of vaccinia from the vaccinee to
contacts, resulting in generalized vaccinia. Vaccinia shedding does occur from the
vaccinee for up to three weeks. The overall risk appears to run about 3 in 100,000

vaccinees, and nearly all cases occurred in close contact secondary shared households,
but these assessments are based on epidemiologic studies done in the 1960s. 84 At greater
risk of acquiring contact vaccinia are those with preexisting eczema as was seen in these

same studies. 7
Contraindications to getting the vaccine are eczema, immunosupression (from

malignancy, immunosuppressive medicines, radiation, etc), immunodeficiency, having
household contacts with any of the above, pregnancy, allergy to vaccine components

(glycerin, polymixin B, streptomycin, tetracycline, neomycin, phenol). 81 It is important
to note that these are relative contraindications with the exception of severe

immunodeficiency. What’s more, these contraindications are in relation to pre-exposure
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particularly after seven recent vaccinees experienced myocardial complications including
2 deaths.S6The plan had been to vaccinate those healthcare workers likely to be exposed
to smallpox, such as select emergency room staff, first responders, and public health
officials designated for fieldwork for such an event. As of April 4 th, 2003 the total

number of people vaccinated was 31,297. 87’88 The HHS plan had anticipated vaccinating
half a million health care and public health workers. 81 In the event of a smallpox attack,

any primary care provider and their staff who may be seeing infected patients should be
vaccinated. 82

At this time there is no need for the general public to be given smallpox vaccine.
There is no threat imminent and in the event of an attack, there is enough vaccine to
administer to everyone and should the need arise the CDC plan would result in the
vaccination of every American within days.

Smallpox and bioterrorism.

Among the Category A agents, all are found in naturally occurring settings albeit
rarely. The only exception to that is smallpox Thus, barring a truly extraordinary travel or
occupational history, a case of smallpox indicates the use of a biological weapon and
even a single case is deemed an intemational medical emergency. That is to say,

diagnosing smallpox equates with diagnosing bioterrorism. 8
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Viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs)

The VHFs are illnesses that result from four families of RNA viruses, all

possessing lipid envelope, and causing hemorrhagic fever syndromes" Filoviridae which
includes Ebola and Marburg viruses, Arenaviridae that include the etiologic agents of

Argentine, Bolivian, and Venezuelan hemorrhagic fevers, Machupo and Lassa fever,
Bunyaviridae that includes the Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV) and
the Rift Valley fever (RVF), and finally, Flaviviridae which includes dengue and yellow
fever viruses. 89

Background
Since the first documented case of a Marburg in 1967, VHFs have been identified

all over the world and have observable intermittent naturally occurring outbreaks. As a

general rule, they reside in animal hosts (although the host of the Filoviruses is

unknown).
It is documented that the VHFs have been weaponized by the US govemment as
well as the Soviet, and later, Russian governments. Other govemments are suspected to

have done so as well. 9

Epidemiology
There have been 18 Marburg or Ebola outbreaks of VHFs since 1967, mostly in

Africa, with approximately 1600 patients. Most infection occurred through direct contact
with infected animal or human fluid or tissue or by needle stick infection of health care

workers. Percutaenous introduction of the viruses results in a higher mortality rate

compared with other means of disease acquisition. 89
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Means of transmission
Soviet bioweapons scientists claim they aerosolized Marburg virus and found in

primate studies that, as an aerosol, it is extraordinarily infectious. Further primate studies
revealed that Ebola, Marburg, Lassa, and New World Arenavimses can also cause
infection through aerosolized forms. 90
Filoviridae (Ebola, Marburg)
Infection seems to result from indirect routes such as aerosol from infected animal

feces, from infected arthropod bites, or by handling of infected animal carcass. Infected
humans can infect others through close contacts.91precise information about the nature of
transmission does not exist at present since outbreaks are sporadic, subside quickly, and

tend to occur in areas without adequate public health involvement. Contact histories are

often difficult to ascertain or are muddied. Person-to-person airborne transmission
cannot be ruled out, though a number of these outbreaks have ended without airborne

precautions ever being taken. 9
Ebola has been found in significant amounts in human skin and sweat glands and
there is concern that casual contact could spread the virus. 89 Primate studies indicate that
the vires can be taken up through the mucosal lining. 9
Transmission does not appear to occur during the incubation (determined in

primate studies to be several days).

89,91

Arenaviridae (Lassa, Machupo)

In the natural setting, Arenaviruses are transmitted to humans by the aerosols
from infected rodent waste products or by contact of mucus membranes or open skin with
the virus. Person-to-person transmission is believed to occur secondary to direct contact
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with infected body fluid; transmission through airborne droplets cannot be ruled Out. 9

Bunyaviridae (RVF, CCHFV)

Humans become infected as a result of a bite from an infected mosquito,
inhalation of aerosolized virions from infected animal, carcasses, physical contact with
infected animal tissue, and there is also strong evidence that infection can occur through

consumption of infected animal milk. It is presently felt that no person-persontransmission can occur despite the vires being found in oropharyngeal swabs.

89

Flaviviridae (Yellow fever, Omsk hemorrhagic fever, and Kyanasur Forest Disease,

Dengue)
Infection from this family is introduced into humans via bites" yellow fever and

dengue from mosquitoes and Omsk HF and Kyanasur Forest disease from tick bites. No
person-to-person bites have been reported. 91
Pathogenesis
The basic pathophysiologic mechanism of how these viruses function in vivo is

presently not fully understood. All the viruses appear to result in platelet deficiency and
or platelet dysfunction, and all seem to lead to a bleeding diathesis. RVF and yellow

fever tend to cause disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC), while Marburg acts by

causing direct endothelial and platelet damage and Ebola by cytokine dysregulation via a
secreted glycoprotein. 9
Filovimses are able to necrose the visceral organ systems-especially the liver,

spleen and kidneys. However, the mechanism of the necrosis is unclear; it may be
secondary to damage of the local microvasculature or by cytotoxic effect of the
filovimses. As stated earlier, Marburg is believed to function by causing direct
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endothelial and platelet damage while Ebola by cytokine dysregulation via a secreted

glycoprotein. 92
Arenaviruses infection begins in the nasopharyngeal mucosa where it replicates

and eventually is found in all tissue. Since little or no cytotoxic effect is noted, it is

postulated that the virulence is a result of inducing cytokine dysregulation.
The hemorrhaging seen with arenavirus infection appears to be secondary to both a
secreted inhibitor of platelet aggregation and an induced thrombocytopenia. DIC tends
not to be seen with Arenavirus infections. 92

Bunyaviridae infections, specifically RVF infections, have direct cytotoxic effects
on the host cells. The mechanism for the bleeding diathesis is not understood but thought

to be a combination of hepatocyte necrosis and vasculitis. 9

Flaviviridae, specifically yellow fever, has a direct cytotoxic effect on host cells

(similarly to Raft Valley). Late in .the illness, infection and subsequent destruction of

hepatocytes occurs without an inflammatory component. RVF and yellow fever tend to
cause DIC. The pathophysiology is unknown for Omsk HF and Kyanasur Forest disease

but both involve destruction of the liver and spleen, and cause hemorrhagic pneumonia. 9

Signs and symptoms

Current information regarding clinical presentations is based on reports from the

naturally occurring epidemics. The range of signs and symptoms is quite broad and there
are a significant number of patients who have presentations quite different than the

textbook descriptions. What’s more, each particular virus has a greater or lesser tendency
to present classically, making a definitive clinical diagnosis from among these difficult

(See table 14 for distinguishing features). 89,91
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Early" Following a 2 to 20 day incubation period, the classic VHF presenting
symptoms include" a viral prodrome lasting less than one week with, headache, joint and
muscle pain, nausea, abdominal pain, prostration, hypotension, bradycardia, tachypnea,

conjunctivitis, pharyngitis, and non-bloody diarrhea. Rash is also a presenting sign but
the nature of the rash varies among the viruses. RVF and the flaviviruses are

accompanied by jaundice.

89,91

With filoviruses, RVF, and flavivirus the signs and symptoms come on rapidly
while arenaviruses presents with slower onset.

89

Late: azotemia, oliguria, a worsening bleeding diathesis which may involve
hematuria, hematemesis, petechiae, conjunctival hemorrhage, mucosal hemorrhage, DIC,
and hypovolemic shock. A poor prognosis is suggested by the following CNS findings--

delirium, convulsions, cerebellar deficits, or coma. 90

Long-term sequalae include alopecia, malaise, prostration, cachexia, diminished
hearing and/or visual abilities, cerebellar dysfunction, pericarditis, and pancreatitis.
When shock, multi-organ system failure, and bleeding diathesis begin, death

commonly follows.
Mortality rates run as low as 0.5% for Omsk HF and as high as 90% for Ebola. 89’\9

Labs

Laboratory abnormalities include: anemia or hemoconcentration,
thrombocytopenia, elevated LFTS. A low WBC count is seen in nearly all the VHFs with
the exception of Lassa that has an elevated WBC.
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Coagulation studies reveal prolonged bleeding times, activated partial
thromboplastin time, prothrombrin time; elevated fibrin degradation products, and
decreased fibrinogen.

Urinalysis may indicate proteinuria and/or hematuria. 89’ 9
Microscopy

No laboratories will be suited for diagnosing VHFs as BSL-4 is needed and only
two labs in the nation could even accept samples in a suspected case. The only two sites

that can accept specimens for analyses are the CDC and the USAMRIID. Plans exist to
make making selected Public Health laboratories capable of handling such a sample but
for the time being only these two exist. 89

However, should a sample be sent to one of these labs, diagnosis is made via
antigen-capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), and/or by IgM antibody
7
detection with antibody-capture ELISA, PCR, and viral isolation. Preliminary results

can be given within 24 hours. 9

Radiograph ic findings

No distinctive radiological findings are associated with botulinum exposure.

Differential Diagnosis
Infectious diseases that could mimic VHFs include: Influenza virus, typhoid

fever, viral hepatitis, non-typhoidal salmonellosis, leptospirosis, rickettsial infections,

shigellosis, relapsing fever, and meningococcemia, and the infectious causes of DIC.
Non-infectious diagnoses to consider include: fulminant hepatitis, leukemia, lupus

erythematosus, hemolytic uremic syndrome, idiopathic or thrombotic thrombocytopenic

purpura, and the non-infectious causes of DIC. 89
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Diagnosis

As always, a high index of suspicion is needed to make the diagnosis particularly
in the context of a potential bioterrorist attack. Because of the difficulty with obtaining

laboratory diagnosis as discussed above, and because of the seriousness of VHFs because
the rarity of seeing such a case in the US, the primary car physician must make a

preliminary diagnosis based on the history and clinical presentation alone (See table 17).
Further distinction of the specific VHF virus that is causing the infection will be even
more difficult, but clinical clues may help differentiate these

(see table 16) 17-19

Risk factors for a naturally occurring VHF infection include: travel history

positive for recent visits to Africa and/or Asia, contact with sick animals or their corpses,
sick human contact, recent tick bite (within 3 weeks). A deliberate infection with a

biological agent would reveal no risk factors other than potential occupational and travel
histories such as govemment officials or their employees, recent travel to monuments or

political speeches, etc (see section Primary Care Physicians and Public Health below).
The WHO recommends making the diagnosis of an index if a series of clinical
conditions are met (See table 17). Of course, in the event of an outbreak, the difficulty in

making a diagnosis will be considerably less. 9

o
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Table 17 Criteria for diagnosis of VHF

Making the diagnosis of VHFs
Pattern identification: Multiple, concurrent cases of febrile illness with evidence of
bleeding diathesis
Presentation: Febrile: 1. temperature 101 F of less than 3 weeks duration;
2. No risk factors for hemorrhagic manifestations;
3. Two or more of the following hemorrhagic symptoms:
hemorrhagic or purple rash,
epistaxis,
hematemesis,
hemoptysis,
hematachezia
no established alternative diagnosis.
Findings: History, presentation, and epidemiology determine the diagnosis
Adapted from Borio

90

On the whole, the medical management of the various VHFs is the same

regardless of which virus is actually the cause: supportive measures. Such measure will
likely be needed to address the hematological, hemodynamic, neurological, and

pulmonary issues. As the disease progresses, patients will likely need intensive fluid
resuscitation, electrolyte management, dialysis, mechanical ventilation, as well as
administration of pressors. Clearly, then, many will require placement in critical care
units. 91

Because of the associated bleeding diathesis, injections and anticoagulam
medicines should be avoided, if possible.

It should be noted that the extent of fluid resuscitation in treatment of volume loss
must be evaluated with consideration of pulmonary edema. 89

There are no FDA approved antiviral medicines for treatment of VHFs.
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Ribavirin, the antiretroviral medicine, has been shown in animal studies to

improve mortality in RVF, and both morbidity and mortality in Lassa fever. It is available
under compassionate use protocols (see Appendix C for dosing schedule).

89

Bunyavimses, specifically, RVF, seems to respond to alpha interferon in animal
experiments, but only if administered just prior to or just after infection. The interferon
seems to reduce viremia and minimize liver cytotoxicity. Passive immunization with

neutralizing antibody inhibited viremia in infected primates. 9
Those with possible exposure should be monitored for fever (of 101 or greater)
and other clinically suggestive signs (see table 17) for up to three weeks following

exposure.

Prophylaxis

Pre-exposure: At the present time, vaccinations for VHFs are being researched.
The only licensed vaccine is for yellow fever.

Post exposure- There are no guidelines or even recommendations for management
of post-exposure prophylaxis in an asymptomatic patient. If the patient begins to

demonstrate the defining signs and symptoms (see table 17) ribavirin therapy should be
initiated if VHF is presumed. However, if it is known to be a filovirus or flavivirus,
ribavirin is not indicated. 9

Percutaenous and exposure with infected bodily fluids should be washed with
soap and water while mucocutaneous exposures should be irrigated generously with
saline. 89
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Infection Control
Extreme caution should be practiced when evaluating and/or treating a patient
thought to have VHF. All bodily fluids and secretions of VHF patients should be handled
with extreme care. VHFs will have impressive viral loads in these fluids. Clearly then,

sharps require the same level of vigilance. The filovimses and arenavimses may be
transmitted through aerosol form and thus admission to an inpatiem room with negative
air pressure is warranted with contact isolation measures including double gloves, shoe

coverings, full, impermeable gowns, and face shields. If patients are actively

hemorrhaging, coughing, vomiting or having diarrhea, airborne isolation will be need. 89

Patient Education

Many Americans are now quite concerned about the affect of world politics on
day-to-day life in the United States, including the possibility and consequences of
additional terrorist attacks. An attack involving biological or other weapons of mass

destruction is implicit in that fear and is a popular topic in the mainstream media. As a

result, it is likely that people will have concerns and questions about these issues. It
stands to reason that primary care physicians will be looked to for answers by their

patiems. In every community, patients will likely come to their primary care physician at
some point looking for health related (and possibly non-health related) answers. Much of

the information provided in the preceding sections was included in anticipation of areas
of patient inquiry. However, additional information may prove to be useful that was not
mentioned above or has been re-worded here for purposes of addressing specific
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questions. A list of freely available patient information resources on bioterrorism is
included in Appendix H as well as freely available physician information resources in

Appendix I.

Answers to common patient questions

Q: What is the likelihood of a large biological attack on the United States?
A: The risk of a large-scale attack is thought to be quite low, primarily because of the
logistical complexity involved. Many experts consider the possibility unlikely at this
time.

Q: I received a smallpox vaccine as a child and don’t recall any problems with bad
reactions. Has the vaccine changed?
A: There very similar problems today as there was previously but back then there was not
the same level of attention in part because the risk of contracting the disease was
overshadowed by the much unlikelier risk of side affects from the vaccine.
Remember, while minor side effects are somewhat common, life-threatening side
effects are uncommon.
Historically, between 14 and 52 people per 1 million vaccinated experienced
potentially life-threatening reactions. It is estimated that between 1 and 2 people out of
every 1 million actually died as a result of life-threatening reactions to the vaccine.

Q: Can I contract smallpox from getting the vaccine?
A: No. The smallpox vaccine does not contain smallpox virus. However, the vaccine does
contain another virus called vaccinia, which is related to smallpox. This virus is not
dangerous but it is possible to develop an infection from vaccinia and also to transmit
infection to anyone who might touch the vaccination site or anything that has come into
contact with it (your hands, old bandages, etc). This can be prevented by keeping the
vaccination site covered at all times, by proper maintenance of the vaccination site with
clean dressings and proper disposal of old dressings, and hand washing.

Q: Is it possible to get vaccinia from someone who has recently been vaccinated?
Yes. Vaccinia is spread by touching a vaccination site before it has healed or by touching
bandages or clothing that have become contaminated with live virus from the vaccination
site. Vaccinia is not spread through airborne contagion. Symptoms of infection with
vaccinia virus include rash, fever, and head and body aches.
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Q" If I have received a smallpox vaccine, are my small children at home at risk?
A: No. There is no increased risk to children because of your vaccination. Additionally,
the only way to infect a child in the household or anyone else is through contact with the
vaccination site or contact with anything that has been in contact with the site such as
clothing, bandages, etc.

Q: If I received a smallpox vaccine as a child, am I still protected?
A: It appears that childhood vaccination does not offer protection beyond 10 years.
However it may offer some ameliorating benefit. See section on smallpox vaccine"
above. CDC
Q: If I received the smallpox vaccine as a child and did not have a bad reaction,
does that mean I can get vaccinated now without a problem?
A" Having been vaccinated without adverse reactions as child does not ensure freedom
from adverse vaccination reactions now. The risk factors for adverse reactions, such as
eczema, might not have arisen at that time. Also, as an adult, other illnesses may be
present that are undiagnosed (e.g., cancer, heart conditions, immunodeficiencies, etc) and
that may increase your risk for an event. 87

Q: How do I best prepare for a bioterrorist attack?
A: Preparations should be no different than for natural threats (hurricanes, blizzards, etc).
Keep a few days of food and water in storage as well a radio with fresh batteries, cell
phone batteries, etc.
Another important item is a list of emergency contact numbers accessible at work,
school and home. Items such as gas masks are not needed since they only work for
certain agents and need to be properly fitted. Ready.gov
Q- Should I take antibiotics if there is a bioterrorist attack?
A: No. Antibiotics are not useful against all agents. Regardless of the agent involved,
taking antibiotics improperly may cause you to become ill, and may make infection
worse. Follow your doctor’s instructions for taking antibiotics. CDC

Q: What should I do if there is a bioterrorism attack?
A: According to FEMA, the best things to do are as follows: Listen to the radio or
television for instructions and advisories. If you are to remain in the building where you
are, turn of ventilation systems, air conditioners, etc. Try to keep a radio with you. Stay
in the most internal room-that is, the room with fewest, or without windows.
If you are outdoors, stay as far from contaminated airways as possible, upwind if
possible and listen to the radio for instructions.
Although only masks with proper filtration ability provide safety, covering your
mouth with fabric thickly layered that still allows proper breathing)- such as a folded shirt
can be of some help. Wash yourself with soap and water when possible.

Q: Should I seal my windows and doors with tape in case of a biological attack?
A: While there is some disagreement about sealing windows and doors, most experts
agree that sealing windows and doors probably won’t make enough of a difference to
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warrant such action. It may slow down air movement, but it won’t stop it and thus
probably won’t offer much protection. Additionally, if you are in a room with a fuelbased heater, carbon monoxide may build up.

Q" What should I do if I see an unidentified white powder in a package or letter or
anywhere else?
A: Most importantly, do not touch it. If it is possible, keep it covered. Alert others in the
vicinity of the concern. If you are at work, notify your supervisor and a law enforcement
agency. Likewise, if you’re at home, call the local law enforcement agency.
Wash your hands or exposed parts thoroughly with soap and water. Try and determine
who may have been exposed to the powder, write down their names and give the list to
the law enforcement agents.

Q: What should I do if I think I am exposed to a biological agent?
A: Call your doctor or go to the nearest ED if necessary. After evaluation, the doctors
will decide if further work-up is needed or if public health officials need to be contacted.
Q- In the event of a biological attack, is it OK to drink tap water?
A: Unless instructed not to do so, it is safe to drink from the tap. Contaminating the water
supply is extremely difficult because of the dilutional effect from the tremendous volume
and because of the antiseptic nature of processing involved in water treatment.

Primary Care Physicians’ Issues in the Context of Bioterrorism

It is worth repeating that bioterrorism presents a number of challenges for the
primary care physician.

A community-based physician needs to be intimately familiar with the any
bioterrorist preparedness and response plans that the local municipality is intending to
use. Being familiar with national responses as well as those of FEMA and the CDC so

that in the event of a diagnosis or simply living through an attack, as a physician you’ll
know what proper protocol is. 93
The primary care physician should have a readily available list of all necessary

phone and fax numbers for health and law enforcemem officials at the local, state, and
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federal levels to be notified if he or she suspects diagnosis of an infection with a

biological agent (see Appendix E).
Should a primary care physician suspect a case of infection with a biological

agent, the process of notification must begin. Local health officials should be informed
for assistance in making the determination but also for preparing to implement action
should it turn out to be an attack immediately (see appendix H for phone and fax numbers

of state and nationwide contact information). The Category A Biological agents fall into

Category 1 reportable diseases in Connecticut, requiting immediate telephone notification
of both the local and state health departments (see Appendix G) that day along with
submission of a PD-23 Confidential Disease report (see Appendix H-l) to be mailed
within 12 hours in an envelope marked "confidential." All communications must include

the physician’s name and address (and that of the person reporting if it is not the

physician), as well as the name, address, race/ethnicity, sex, and occupation, gender and
occupation of the person affected. If deliberate exposure is suspected, the FBI must be
notified, as well (see table 18).

94,95

Table 18 Notification for infection with a biological weapon

Notification (see Appendix E)

1. Local public health officer (See appendix H for phone and fax)

State Health Department" Epidemiologist and Bioterrorism
coordinator (see Appendix G for phone and fax).
3. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (see Appendix G for phone)
4. FBI, if diagnosis, is probable (see Appendix G for phone)
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The earliest possible identification, notification, diagnosis and treatment is vital
not only for the patient but also for the community and possibly the nation. 43 The primary
care physician should be familiar enough with the biological agents to competently

manage the situation until public health and law enforcement officials begin their
fieldwork or longer if public health officials are unable to be contacted or response is

delayed. Proper management of the situation by the physician includes not only medical
management but also adequate quarantine, if appropriate, administration of prophylaxis
as appropriate, etc

(See above sections on category A agents, and Appendices A through

There are several ways to develop and maintain a strong working knowledge of

biological agents, their symptoms diagnosis and management. Numerous medical books
are available but David Henderson’s book, "Bioterrorism" Guidelines for Medical and

Public Health Management" (published by JAMA, 2002) stands out among them. Other
means include utilizing online resources such as those listed in Appendix I. One site, the

Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality is designed specifically for primary care
physicians and even provides quizzes to test bioterrorism knowledge. Both the US

military and CDC offer regular bioterrorism related trainings, seminars--some live on
satellite others available on video--- and CME credits may be gained for such trainings.

The CDC provides trainings through its Health Alert Network that makes available

previous broadcast and webcasts. The CDC also maintains updates and notifications

through an email registry for clinicians. See Appendix I for further information.
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The primary care physician must be ever vigilant. As has been discussed

repeatedly here and elsewhere, the signs and symptoms of the biological agents are nonspecific, especially early on. When a patient comes into the office with such symptoms,
the possibility of biological agents cannot be dismissed out of hand. As with the
establishment of any diagnosis, a good history is one of the best tools a clinician has.

However, the history will have to be thorough, even pointed at times, in order to
determine the likelihood of an exposure (See table 19). Areas to inquire about include"
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Table 19 Bioterrorism History Taking

Full HPI-including details about the onset, timing, rate of progression, and nature of
signs and symptoms.
Full PMH noting relevant co-morbidities or
Medicines-Full list of medicines the patient is on including any treatments taken to
treat present symptoms, of note are antibiotic regimens.
Full Social History- Member of high-risk, high profile group organizations. Including
politicized, loved/hated- ethnic, racial, religious, political, activist groups,
organizations, or associations.
Occupational HistoryA. High risk occupation1. Governmental: postal worker, elected officials, government official,
government employee, postal worker, FBI or other law enforcement
agent. City, state or federal employees of any capacity (but particularly
those with jobs in high risk departments).
2. Non-governmental: Employed at major corporation (such as Wall
Street firms, working for major media outlet-television, radio,
newspaper.
Low-profile job with high profile associationsmailroom worker at
media company, fortune 500, government office.
3. Related occupation-lab tech, researcher, healthcare.
B. Close association (spouse, parent, significant other) with any of the above
Exposure historyA. Animal-rodent or rabbit contacts, exotic animal or carcass contacts
B. Miscellaneous-contact-strange or suspicious packages, substances, liquids,
receiving gifts or imported goods from foreign lands.
C. Sick contacts- close association with others with similar symptoms
D. Ingestion history
1. Diet-any changes in eating habits, unusual foods, canned or jarred
items, illness in others who ate same foods
2. Water---unusual water sources (camping, swimming)
Travel history:

A. International
1. Developing nations or locales where naturally occurring infections
of Category A, B, and C occur; visits to such countries plus contact
with animals, or sick contact; countries with strong anti-American.
B. Domestic
1. Recent visits to prominent sites-monuments, government buildings,
tourist spots, (high ranking), attendance at political speeches or rallies;
visits to major US cities-New York, Boston, San Francisco.
Cluster history-illness associations- co-workers, family members, travel group,
neighbors, fellow travelers.
Clusterin of animal deaths in local area or traveled to areas.
B ioterrorism HistoryThis is by no means intended to be an exhaustive list but meant to
guide the physician in taking a thorough history.
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high-risk jobs, high-risk associations, sick contacts-human and animal; international
travel-for high-risk destinations both for infections or politics, likely target sites, etc.
The clinician should be prepared to collect adequate samples for laboratory study’
and should comfortable with how to properly and safely collect samples (See Appendix

D). Medical management will likely be needed. The primary care physician should be
familiar with the regimens as well as for the differences between treating an isolated case
versus treating patients amidst an epidemicwhich centers on parenteral versus oral

administration (see Appendices C and B). Unfortunately, at the present time, no clinical

pathways exist to help the primary care physician with such distinction and thus the
physician is relying on history, empirical epidemiology, and clinical acumen to know
where bioterrorism sits in the differential diagnosis.

As a general rule, infection with biological agents will be extremely low perhaps
even last (or lower) on a differential diagnosis, but any positive findings from the history

will elevate it. Because a large-scale attack would affect large segments of the

population, epidemiology is useful is identifying the clustering of non-specific illnesses
and concurrent patients with similar signs, symptoms and other findings. As well as
concurrent cases with similar signs, symptoms and other findings. Certainly, if other

patients come in with similar histories such as attendance at a public event and similar

symptoms, especially unexplained fever or respiratory distress would be suggestive.

Ages, co-morbidities (or the lack thereof) may be useful as well as would, reports of any
recent animal deaths in the area. (See Table 19)
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The primary care physician must be prepared to step outside the confines of
clinician and into the broader role of public health provider. What’s more, since the

presenting symptoms of a biological agent may not be specific enough for immediate
diagnosis, the primary care physician must be prepared to follow-up on all the necessary
issues should a positive diagnosis be confirmed. For example, by learning of an outbreak
or of positive test results immediate notification not only of the proper public health

channels must take place, but also following up with the patient as a top priority as well,
and contacting other patients who may have presented with similar symptoms for

advisement, possible isolation, further work up, initiation of medicines for the patient and

prophylaxis for contacts, etc. Or if the primary care physician is suspicious, then the
patient needs proper education about signs and symptoms to be on the watch for and to
return to clinic or report to the nearest ED if necessary. 42 The physician must always be
mindful of appropriate prophylactic considerations for staff and for self.

Another issue that relates to living under the threat of bioterrorism is accurately

ruling out the diagnosis infection with biological agents, especially for an Americans
whose fear and anxiety levels are heightened since September 1 lth, and even more so
with the present military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. Sometimes referred to as the

"worried well," these patients are symptomatic but no physical problems can be detected.
Since the post-September 1 lth anthrax attacks, every few months or so, suspicious white

powder is found somewhere causing a furor and much anxiety. As recently as April 22,
2003, was the headline "Postal workers hospitalized in US Pacific Northwest after
Biotoxin Found" referring to a Tacoma postal distribution center, while later the same

day suspicious white powder was found at a cargo terminal in a Florida airport.
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Hundreds of people were evacuated. The postal workers went through a precautionary
decontamination process, and one cargo worker complained of a burning sensation in his

nose.96In the 18 months since the post-September 1 lth anthrax attacks, there are at least
six New York Times reported incidents involving "suspicious white powder" suspected
to be a biological agent. Fortunately, all have turned out to be non-toxic, two important

issues are raised: firstly, that although the immediacy of the post-September 1 l th anthrax

attacks may be gone, there is an underlying anxiety and vigilance that burns in the public
consciousness and is stoked by these intermittent powdery scares. In many of these cases,

’patients’ were brought for medical evaluation. Some even reported symptoms. This
brings again the issue of managing the worried well. Prior to the assessments that

powders were benign, these patients were legitimately afraid for their health. This is a
reminder that the worried well patient is not to be written off as paranoid or neurotic but

that the concerns can be well-founded and that the state of the world makes such patients
a legitimate part of the primary care physician’s responsibility to take seriously and act
with understanding.

Clearly any serious diagnoses will need to be ruled out to the physician’s
satisfaction but the patient can be helped with some education on the subject of

bioterrorism, risks, agents, ands other information, as well as empowered to seek out
information, create "emergency kits," etc (see patient online resources Appendix H). 97

Another important role for the primary care physician will be the monitoring of

those on prophylaxis for exposure, as was seen in the post-September 1 lth anthrax

attacks. Not only does the patient need to be monitored for possible delayed infection, but
for adverse reactions to the prophylaxis, as well. For the post September 11 th anthrax
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attack, the administration of prophylaxis was done through public health authorities but
included local primary care physician acting in capacities such as ensuring informed

consent, advising patients about their exposure risks, the pros and cons of vaccines and
antibiotics, management of side effects, the further intricacies of prophylaxis while
dealing with underlying chronic illnesses, drug interactions, etc. 42 Even under the most

peaceful and quiet of times, we have entered an era when infection with biological agents
must be included on the applicable differential diagnoses no matter how low the

likelihood seems.

The take home message for primary care physician then is that their role focuses
on three main points"

1. Recognition/diagnosis of index and/or clusters of signs, symptoms and other findings
2. Prompt and proper medical management and infection control

3. Prompt contacting of local, state, federal public health authorities as well as law

enforcement authorities, as needed. 42

It is also important to keep a larger perspective, as physicians naturally focus on
the medical issues and hopefully on the public health issues as well. However, in the
event of a bioterrorist attack, there are other, sometimes more pressing issues, and the

physicians must adapt to the circumstance. In other words, if the primary care physician
suspects that a patient is indeed infected with a biological agent, a scenario is elicited that
is complex and unfamiliar. Such an infection would mean not only a serious illness, but

also a crime, an attack from a hostile person or persons, with potential legal, social, and

political implications. In a sense, the medical issues of a particular patient may take a
back seat to the larger social and political issues at hand. 9s
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Appendix C--Dosing regimens
Anthrax 30,50,51,54
Anthrax is thought likely to be susceptible to the following antibiotics: rifampin,

tetracycline, vancomycin, imipenem, meropenem, chloramphenicol, clindamycin, and the
aminoglycosides. Z. These may be selected while susceptibility testing pending and
adjusted thereafter.
Cutaneous anthrax
Regimen
Adults*
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg po bid or doxycycline 100 mg po bid x 60 days**
Children
Ciprofloxacin 10-15 mg/kg ql2h (<1 gm/d) or doxycycline in the
following dose regimens" 8 yrs & >45 kg: 100 mg po ql2h >8 yrs & <45 kg or <8 yrs:
2.2 mg/kg ql2hr x 60 days** ***
Inhalation anthrax
Adult*
Doxycycline 200 mg loading dose IV, then 100 mg IV ql2h plus 1 or 2
other antibiotics**
Ciprofloxacin 400 mg IV ql2h plus 1 or 2 other antibiotics**

Note: Switch to po therapy when clinically appropriate with Ciprofloxacin 500 mg bid or
doxy 100 mg bid to complete 60 days
therapy.
** Other antibiotics that are active in vitro against the current strain: ampicillin,
penicillin, clindamycin, clarithromycin, imipenem, vancomycin, rifampin,
chloramphenicol.
*** Consider steroids with severe edema or meningitis.
**** One drug may be used when patient has stabilized. Q-e

Plague 0,67
Individual case
Adults
Streptomycin 30 mg/kg/day IM in two divided doses x 14 d; or
Gentamicin, 5mg/kg IM or IV qd 14 d, or
2mg/kg loading dose followed by 1.75 mg/kg IM or IV q 8 hours;
Doxycycline 200 mg initially, followed by 100 mg every 12 hours.
* The patient is typically afebrile after 3 days, but continued therapy prevents relapses.
* Animal studies indicate that quinolone antibiotics may also be effective.
Recommendations: Ciprofloxacin 400mg IV bid.

Plague Meningitis
Adults: Chloramphenicol 25 mg/kg IV loading dose, then 15 mg/kg IV qid x 10-14 days
121
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Plague Mass Infection or post exposure prophylaxis
Adults:
Doxycycline 100 mg orally bid.
*Ciprofloxacin 500 mg orally twice daily has also shown to effective in animal studies,
and may be more available in a wartime setting as it is also distributed in blister packs for
anthrax Post-exposure prophylaxis.
Alternatives:

Tetracycline, 500 mg po four times daily, and
chloramphenicol, 25 mg/kg orally qid,

Botulinum 29’
Dosing for Botulinum Antitoxin
* a single 10-mL vial is used per patient,
* it is diluted to 1:10 in 0.9% saline solution
*it should be administered by slow intravenous infusion.
* One vial provides between 5500 and 8500 IU of each type-specific antitoxin.
*****The amount of neutralizing antibody far exceeds the highest serum toxin levels
found in naturally occurring botulism patients, so no further administration is needed. In
the context of deliberate attack with botulinum, it is possible that the serum
concentrations could be far higher than in naturally occurring botulism. It may be
necessary to retest the serum for toxin after initial treatment to assess if additional dosing

would be of therapeutic value.

Tularemia
Known infection
Individual case

Adult: Streptomycin lg IM bid, or
Gentamycin 5mg/kg IM/IV bid.
Alternatives:
Doxycylcine 100 mg/kg IV bid
Chloramphenicol 15mg/kg IV qid (not to be used in pregnant women)
Ciprofloxacin 400mg IV bid
Mass Infection or post exposure prophylaxis
Adult Doxycycline 100 mg po bid
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg po bid
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VHF 89,90
Dosing of Ribavirin *
1. Patients with VHF with unknown pathogen
Indication:
2. Pathogen known to be Arenavirus or Bunyavirus
Individual case:
Adult, pregnant women, children
Loading dose--30 mg/kg IV (max of 2 g) x 1, then
16 mg/kg IV (max of 1 g per dose) q 6 h x 4 d, then
8 mg/kg IV (max of 500 mg per dose) q 8 h x 6 days
Mass Infection or post exposure prophylaxis
Adult, pregnant women
Loading dose2 g pox 1, then
If > 75 kg, 600 mg po bid x 10 days
If <75 kg, 400 q am and 600 q pm x 10 days

* Not FDA approved

Appendix D: Specimens for Laboratory Diagnosis
The following is a selected list of samples to be collected, as is feasible, and sent for
laboratory study in the case of a suspected infection with a biological agent.

Agent

Face or
Nasal
Swab

Acute &

Smear

Blood
Culture

Stool

Urine

Other

Convalescent

Sera
Pleural and
CS fluids
mediastinal
lymph node

Anthrax

spleen
Sputum

Plague

Cut.
Lesion

aspirates
Bubo
aspirate,

CSF,
sputum,
lesion

scraping,
LN
aspirate

+1

Tularemia
Clostridial
Toxins

Congo-Crimean
Hemorrhagic

Wound
tissues
+3

Liver

Fever (VHFs)

3Virus isolation from blood or throat swabs in appropriate containment.
All samples should be sent to:
The Connecticut State Department of Health
Biological Science Services (860) 509-8505
10 Clinton Street
Hartford, CT 06106

(806) 509-8500
Collection Kits (860) 509-8501
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Appendix E

PCP with
patient(s)
suspected
of
inaction
with a bioo

weapon

For primary care physicians, the left hand column is the one of relevance. While the local public
health authority should, ideally, make the initial assessment as to whether the particular case or
cases are indeed a result of bioterrorism, the clinician must be skilled enough to do. If even one
case is thought to be from a bioweapons source, the FBI must be notified. After federal law
enforcement officials are notified (see criteria below), the State Health Department should be
immediately notified. After the FBI and the state HD, then the CD should be contacted.
The CDC has set forth the following criteria for FBI notification:
A. one or more cases, definitively diagnosed with one or more of the following:
1. Any case of smallpox or pulmonary anthrax.
2. Uncommon agent or disease (e.g., smallpox, pulmonary anthrax) occurring in a person with no
other explanation.
3. An illness caused by a microorganism with markedly atypical features (e.g., features suggesting
that the microorganism was genetically altered)
4. An illness due to aerosol or food or water sabotage, as opposed to a usual transmission route.
B. one or more clusters of illnesses that are unexplained after preliminary investigation;
C. deliberate chemical, industrial, radiation or nuclear release.
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Appendix F
Distinguishing naturally occurring forms from their use as biological weapons.
This is not a definitive or comprehensive list. Please note that these are meant to serve as
possible signals to investigate further, not for drawing conclusions: there may be
perfectly legitimate alternative explanations.

The following observations may raise the likelihood of a biological attack.
Clinical Findings
The appearance of non-indigenous bacterial or viruses, or the appearance of unusual
strains of indigenous microbes.
Example-1. The identification of an Ebola strain in the United States, or Europe
Ebola in euro, US
Example-2. The identification of a tularemia strain showing broad antibiotic
resistance.
The sudden appearance of respiratory symptoms or cutaneous lesions in an otherwise
healthy person from a healthy population
Example-1. A 40 year old, otherwise healthy male, with pneumonic symptoms
refractory to antibiotics for community acquired pneumonia.
Multiple cases of the same symptom pattern or diagnosis.
Example-1 More than 1 patient with a maculopular lesion and prodromal

symptoms.
Example-2. Multiple cases of ulceroglandular tularemia, which would suggest a
contaminated food or water source
Seasonal patterns may be factors; that is, it is useful to note whether cases are occurring
in or out of seasonal cycles.
Example-1. Cases of tularemia in early spring or fall rather than the natural
seasonal occurrences of summer and winter.

Public health Findings
An outbreak, even if zoonotic sources are possible, is less likely if distant outbreaks
occur concurrently.
Example. Bubonic plague outbreaks in New York City and in Seattle at the same
time.
The sudden appearance of an unusual form of a naturally occurring disease.

Example. The identification of pneumonic forms of plague without any diagnosed
cases of the bubonic form.
oA disproportionately high concentration of naturally occurring agents noted in samples
of the environment.
Example. Soil samples taken of botulinum show levels orders of magnitude

higher than normal.
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Possible indications of weaponized or modified agent

An epidemic that spreads dramatically faster than is likely in naturally occurring
outbreak. Please note that the rate of spread is a function of many factors including
microbe virulence and concentration and also must be viewed in the context of what stage
the epidemic is.
Example. Rapidly spreading tularemia would be highly unusual
If the disease course of a given microbe present is noted to be uncharacteristically rapid
and/or severe.
If resistance to appropriate and recommended antibiotic regimens is noted.
If person-to-person transmission is noted with an illness that does not naturally do so.
Example. The confirmation that botulism is spreading through close contacts
Noting clustering of cases in a targeted population may be suggestive e.g. religious,
ethnic, or other unifying features of a group
oa subpopulation that seems to be exclusively protected from an outbreak
Example. An outbreak of anthrax in a community, but no members of a white
supremacist group or their families become infected.

Appendix G
Public Health Contact Information
Federal

CDC
24-hour Emergency Response Hotline (770) 448-7100.
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program

(404) 639-0385
Clinician Information Line for Smallpox and Smallpox Vaccination

(877) 554-4625
CDC Clinician Registry for Terrorism and Emergency Response Updates and Training
Opportunities:
http://www.bt, cdc. gov/c linre gi stry/index, asp
Email: cdcresponse@ashastd.org

FBI
Regional office
New Haven, Connecticut 06511-6505
(203) 777-6311

FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
202-324-3000

State
Connecticut Department of Public Health

(860) 509-8000- Emergency--Available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
Bioterrorism Coordinator, Epidemiologist
James Hadler, MD Director Tel. (860) 509-7994/7995
Fax (860) 509-710
Bioterrorism Preparedness Coordinator
Tel. (860) 509 7011
Warren Wollschlager
Fax (860) 509-710

Public Health Laboratory
Dr. Katherine Kelley, Director (860) 509-8500
kati.kelley@po.state.ct.us

Biological Science Services (860) 509-8505
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Appendix H
Phone and Fax numbers for municipal public health departments"
State of Connecticut
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Appendix H-1

Sample of PD-23 Form
To be used for reporting suspected case of Category A biological agents. To be
filled out and sent within 12 hours as a confidential mailing. Please note: reporting by
phone is required the same day to local and state public health departments. If deliberate
exposure is suspected, the FBI must be notified.

136

fL,

ABOR ATORY REPORTABLE SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS-2OO."

The director of any clinical laboratory must report any laboratory evidence suggestive of reportable diseases. A standard form, known
as the Laboratory Report of Significant Findings (OL-15C) is available for reporting these laboratory findings. These forms are
available from the Connecticut Department of Public Health, Epidemiology Program, 410 Capitol Ave., MS#11EPI, P.O. Box 340308,
Hartford, CT 06134-0308; telephone: (860-509-7994). The laboratory reports are not substitutes for physician reports; they are
supplements to physician reports which allow verification of diagnosis. A special listing of diseases indicative of possible bioterrodsm
is highlighted at the end of this list. Changes for 2003 are noted in bold and with an astedsk (*).

AIDS (report only to the State)
CD4+ T-lymphocyte counts <200 cells/pL:
cells/L
CD4+ count < 14% of total lymphocytes: %
Babesiosis: EIlFA IgM (titer) IgG (titer):
EIPCR ElOther:
El Blood smear (1)*
Campylobactedosis (species)
Carboxyhemoglobin > 9%: % COHb
Chancroid
ElCulture ElPCR
Chickenpox, acute: EllgM
ElDFA ElOther:
Chlamydia (C. trachomatis) (test type:
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, age < 55 years (biopsy)
Cryptospoddiosis (method of ID)
Cyclospodasis (method of ID)
Diphtheria (1)
ElHME
Ehdichiosis (2) ElHGE
ElUnspecified
EIlFA ElBIood smear ElPCR ElOther.
Encephalitis:
California group virus (species)
Eastern equine encephalitis virus
St. Louis encephalitis virus
West Nile virus infection- human or animal
Other arbovirus (specify)
Enterococcal infection, vancomycin-resistant (2, 3)
Eschedchia coil O157 infection (1)
Food poisoning (2)"
Giardiasis
Gonorrhea (test type:
Group A streptococcal disease, invasive (1,3)
Group B streptococcal disease, invasive (3)
Haemophilus influenzae disease, invasive, a II serotypes (1,3)
Hansen’s disease (Leprosy)
Hepatitis A El IgM anti-HAV
Hepatitis B El HBsAg El IgM anti-HBc
Hepatitis C (anti-HCV)
Hepatitis delta EiHDAg, El IgM anti-HD
HIV Infection (repod only to the State)
HIV-1 infection in child < 13 years of age (4)
HIV-1 infection in person >_ 13 years of age (5)
Influenza: ElA ElB
Lead Poisoning (blood lead > 10 Ig/dL)
El Finger Stick:
Ig/dL El Venous:
igldL
Legionellosis
El Culture El DFA El Ag positive
El Four-fold serologic change (titers):
Listeriosis (1)
Malaria/blood parasites (1,2)
Measles (Rubeola) (titer):
Meococcal disease, invasive (1,3)
Mercury poisoning
El.Udne > 35 pg/g creatinine
pg/g

Mumps (titer):
Pertussis (titer):

DFA Smear:. El Positive El Negative
Culture:
El Positive El Negative
Pneumococcal disease, invasive (1,3)
Oxacillin disk zone size:
mm
MIC to penidlin:
IglmL
Poliomyelitis
Rocky Mountain spotted fever
Rubella (titer):
Salmonellosis (12) (serogroup/semtype)
Shiga toxin-related disease (1)
Shigellosis (1,2) (serogroup/species)
Staphylococcus aureus infection with MIC to
vancomycin_> 4 IglmL (1)
MIC to vancomycin:
IglmL
Staphylococcus aureus disease, invasive (3)
methicillin-resistant Date pt. Admitted
/
Staphylococcus epidermidis infection with MIC to
vancomydn_> 4 I=g/mL (1)
MIC to vancomydn:
lglmL
Syphilis El RPR (titer): El FTA (titer):
El VDRL (titer): El MHA (titer):
Toxoplesmosis (7) El IgM (tr)___ El IgG (u) El PCR
Trichinosis
Tuberculosis (1)

Specimen type:
AFB Smear:. El Positive El Negative
El Few
If positive: El Rare
El Numerous
Culture:
El Mycobacterum tuberculosis only
El Other mycobactedum (specify: M.
Typhus
VibHo infection (6) (species)
Yersiniosis (species)
Diseases that are possible indicators ofbioterrorism.
Anthrax (1)
Botulism
Brucellosis (1)
Gram positive rod septicemia or meningitis, growth
within 72 hours of Inoculation*
Plague
Q feer
Ricin poisoning

Smallpox
Staphylococcal entemtoxin B pulmonary poisoning
Tularemia
Venezuelan equine encephalitis
Viral hemorrhagic fever

Appendix I (patient handout)

Resources for Patients on bioterrorism
American Psychiatric Association
Coping with B ioterrorism Anxiety

http://www.psych.org/disaster/copingnationaltragedy-main92501 .cfm
This is a useful site for patient’s to read about constructive ways of dealing with anxiety
regarding bioterrorism.
American Red Cross
American Red Cross Homeland Security Advisory

System Recommendations for
Individuals, Families, Neighborhoods, Schools and Businesses.

Department of Homeland Security
h.ttp ://www.ready. gov/b o o gi ca 1.html
http ://www.ready. gov/biological threat.html
http://www.ready.gov/biological_symptoms.html
Ready. Gov is a web site run by the DHS that provides basic instructions and printable
visual aids for strategies to be safe during an attack, and how to recognize signs of
infection. Instructions are available for assembling "emergency kits"
Connecticut Department of Public Health

http://www.dph. state.ct.us/
Has useful links for bioterrorism locally and nationally.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Are You Ready? A Guide to Citizen Preparedness. Provides information on bioterrorism
as well as other man-made disasters and natural disaster, too. This is the source of the oft
cited, recommendations for duct tape and plastic sheets.

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
The Center for Mental Health Services’ Disaster Mental Health homepage
American College of Physicians
B ioterrorism and Antibiotics What You Should Know
http://www, acp online, org/bioterro/antib ioti c s. htm
Discusses the role of antibiotics in the event of a bioterrorist attack.
How to Tell Cold or Flu Symptoms from Inhalational Anthrax
http ://www. acponline, org/bi oterro/in fo_p ati ents. htm
Explains ways to distinguish common types of respiratory infections from inhalational

anthrax.

Frequently Asked Questions About Smallpox (handout?)
http://www, acponline, or g/bioterro/faq_smallp ox. htm
Answers basic but important questions about smallpox infection and vaccination.
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Center for Disease Control
http://www.bt, cdc. gov/
The CDC is the definitive source for bioterrorism information. Offers information for
patients and clinicians on every all topics relating to bioterrorism. Easy to use.

Appendix J
Online Resources for Physicians

Center for Disease Control and prevemion CDC
http://www.bt, cdc. go v/
A portal to all the latest information on any and all bioterrofism related topics, as well as
trainings and educational materials. CME credits are attainable.
They also offer an email registry that sends information on biological agents, updates on
information, as well as announcements of available trainings-onsite and offsite. To
register: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/clinregistry/index.asp
CDC Clinician Information Line for Smallpox and Smallpox Vaccination

(877) 554-4625
CDC Clinician Registry for Terrorism and Emergency Response Updates and Training
Opportunities"
http://www.bt, cdc. gov/c linre gistry/index, asp
Email: cdcresponse@ashastd.org
American College of Physicians online
http ://www. acp online, org/b oterro/?hp
A great site for getting the fundamentals for diagnosis and management of the major
Category A agents as well chemical agents. Also provides links to other resources
Connecticut State Department of Health
http ://209.150.7.232/infoHealthCareProviders. shtml
Offers a variety of links on response strategies at the state and local levels as well as links
to federal planning. A directory of state and local public health officials is available.

Cemer for Civilian Biodefense Studies, John Hopkins University
http ://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/index.html
Based at Johns Hopkins University, this is the online information provided by the
premiere non-governmental group working on Bioterrorism. Provides information on
biological agents, provides the latest strategy developments, recommended reading, and
links.
Virtual Naval Hospital

htt.p ://www.vnh.org
The US Navy’s online medical resource: Virtual Naval Hospital. The information is
concise, up to date and well organized and covers a wider array of topics.
The US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
http ://www.usamriid. army.mil/education/index.html

http://www.biomedtraining.org/proginfo.htm
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Offers off-site civilian trainings on tape and through live broadcasts on various areas of
bioterrorism. CME accreditation is available.

h.ttp ://www.bioterrorism.uab. edu/
A site for specifically for educating primary care physicians on bioterrorism provides
images, self-tests, and links for more resources.
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